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ARBITRATION AND THE FUTURE OF
DELAWARE’S CORPORATE
LAW FRANCHISE
Brian JM Quinn*
I. INTRODUCTION
On September 9, 2011, Skyworks Solutions, Inc. (“Skyworks”)
and Advanced Analogic Technologies Incorporation (“AATI”) en-
tered into a merger agreement.1  The agreement included an un-
common provision with respect to dispute resolution.  In part, that
provision stated, “the parties hereto agree that any and all disputes
arising under or related in any way to this Agreement or the Trans-
actions shall be resolved solely in arbitration before the Court of
Chancery of the State of Delaware.”2  Until AATI later sought
specific performance of the merger agreement via arbitration pur-
suant to that provision, little notice had been paid by outside ob-
servers to the possible implications of arbitration before the
Delaware Chancery Court.3
In early 2010, the Chancery Court in Delaware adopted rules
implementing a new statutory arbitration procedure.4  This proce-
dure is unique in that it employs sitting chancellors as arbitrators in
confidential proceedings before the Delaware Chancery Court.
The Chancery arbitration procedure, which is presently subject to a
citizens’ challenge, raises questions about the propriety of using
public courts for confidential proceedings, as well as the potential
negative impact of confidential Chancery arbitration proceedings
on the continuing value of Delaware’s corporate law franchise.5  It
* Assistant Professor of Law, Boston College Law School. J.D., M.L.S., Stanford Law School;
M.P.P., Harvard University Kennedy School of Government; B.S.F.S., Georgetown University.
Research for this paper was made possible by the Boston College Law Fund. Thanks to Mary-
Rose Papandrea and participants in the Boston College Law School summer brownbag series.
Also thanks to Chris Hiserman (BCLS, ’12) and Jackie De La Rosa (BCLS, ’14) for their helpful
research assistance.
1 Skyworks Solutions, Inc., FORM S-4 (Sept. 9, 2011).
2 Section 9.11, Agreement and Plan of Merger, by and among Skyworks Solutions, Inc. and
Advanced Analogic Technologies Inc., Annex A, FORM S-4 (Sept. 9, 2011).
3 See Skyworks Solutions, Inc., FORM 8-K (Sept. 26, 2011).
4 DEL. CH. R. 96–98 (2010).
5 See Del. Coal. for Open Gov’t v. Strine, 2012 WL 3744718 (D. Del. Aug. 30, 2012).
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also raises larger questions about the appropriateness of confiden-
tial arbitration in the context of shareholder litigation.
By now, the dynamics of state competition for incorporations
have been thoroughly analyzed.  Professors William Cary and
Judge Ralph Winter debated whether state competition for incor-
porations resembled more of a “race to the bottom” or a “race to
the top,” with respect to corporate governance.6  Later studies by
Professors Marcel Kahan and Ehud Kamar, and also Robert
Daines, concluded that, at least in recent years, the notion of inter-
state competition for incorporations is largely a myth.7  Rather, to
the extent there is competition with respect to the corporate law, it
is not for incorporations so much as it is for corporate governance.
In that sphere, Professors Mark Roe and Renee Jones have noted
the salient competition for Delaware is the federal government,
which is engaged in a push-pull relationship with Delaware over
corporate governance matters.8
Delaware’s adoption of its new arbitration procedure hints at
another dimension for competition with respect to corporate law:
the competition for adjudications.9  Competition for adjudications
occurs on at least two levels.  First, there is the issue of multi-forum
litigation.10 Acquisitions are now regularly accompanied by law-
suits.  Plaintiffs bring competing lawsuits, often worth only their
settlement value, in the state of incorporation and another state
where a court might have jurisdiction.  Courts find themselves
6 William L. Cary, Federalism and Corporate Law: Reflections upon Delaware, 83 YALE L.J.
663, 666 (1973) (on the “race to the bottom”). See generally Ralph K. Winter, State
Law, Shareholder Protection, and the Theory of the Corporation, 6 J. LEGAL STUD. 251 (1977)
(on the “race to the top”).
7 See generally Robert Daines, The Incorporation Choices of IPO Firms, 77 N.Y.U. L. REV.
1559 (2002); Marcel Kahan & Ehud Kamar, The Myth of State Competition in Corporate Law, 55
STAN. L. REV. 679 (2002).
8 See generally Renee M. Jones, Rethinking Corporate Federalism in the Era of Corporate
Reform, 29 J. CORP. L. 625 (2004); Mark Roe, Delaware’s Competition 117 HARV. L. REV. 588
(2003).
9 See Jill E. Fisch, The Peculiar Role of the Delaware Courts in the Competition for Corpo-
rate Charters, 68 U. CIN. L. REV. 1061 (1999) (describing the value added by the judicial lawmak-
ing of Delaware courts).
10 See John Armour, Bernard Black, & Brian Cheffins, Delaware’s Balancing Act, 87 IND. L.
REV. 1345 (2012); Matthew Cain & Steven Davidoff, A Great Game: The Dynamics of State
Competition and Litigation (Apr. 1, 2012), available at http://ssrn.com/abstract=1984758; Daines,
supra note 7; Joseph Grundfest, The History and Evolution Of Intra-Corporate Forum Selection
Clauses: An Empirical Analysis, 37 DEL. J. CORP. L. 334 (2012); Brian JM Quinn, Shareholder
Litigation, Status Quo Bias, and Adoption of the Exclusive Forum Provision, 45 U.C. DAVIS L.
REV. 137 (2011); Randall Thomas & Robert Thompson, A Theory of Representative Shareholder
Suits and its Application to Multi-Jurisdictional Litigation, 106 NW. U. L. REV. 1753 (2012).
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playing an uncomfortable role as mediator in the battle amongst
the plaintiff bar over the appropriate forum, control of the litiga-
tion, and, finally, settlement.  Elsewhere I have suggested a self-
help approach to mitigating the worst excesses of the multi-forum
litigation problem.11
A second locus of competition for adjudications stems from
the growing popularity of commercial arbitration.  Since the pas-
sage of the Federal Arbitration Act (“FAA”) in 1925, there has
been an increasing interest in private arbitration.12  This has been
encouraged, in part, by the Supreme Court’s stated “strong pre-
sumption in favor of arbitration” where contracting parties opt for
private ordering over public adjudication.13  At the same time, pri-
vate arbitration presents a competitive dilemma for our common
law system of public adjudication.14  To the extent parties opt for
more informal dispute resolution systems, like arbitration, they
may reduce the network value of Delaware’s franchise by reducing
the marginal production of legal rules by the courts.  In the same
way the movement to private adjudication has limited the develop-
ment of the common law in other areas, a shift over time from the
public courts to private systems of adjudication may present a
more potent threat to Delaware’s franchise than to that of any
other state.15
Adjudications play important dual roles. First, adjudications
permit parties to resolve their individual disputes.  Efficient dis-
pute resolution for the parties is an important service—one that
can compel parties to seek one forum over another.  Second, adju-
dications in the formal legal system generate rules that third parties
can rely on in similar fact situations.16  The positive network exter-
11 See Quinn, supra note 10 (proposing a possible self-help solution to the problem of multi-
forum transaction-related litigation).
12 Federal Arbitration Act (FAA), 9 U.S.C. §§ 1–14 (1925).
13 See, e.g., Great Western Mortgage Corp. v. Peacock, 110 F.3d 222, 228 (3d Cir. 1997).
14 The question of the potentially negative impacts of private arbitration and other forms of
alternative dispute resolution was the subject of a good deal of academic debate in the 1980s.
See the large literature spawned by Owen Fiss’ article Against Settlement.  Owen M. Fiss, Against
Settlement, 93 YALE L.J. 1073 (1984).
15 For an example of how increased reliance on arbitration can reduce the marginal produc-
tion of legal rules by the courts, see recent comments by Justice Anthony Kennedy.  Justice
Kennedy remarked on the dearth of civil law cases before the Supreme Court and noted that
arbitration is in part responsible for the decline in civil appeals: “The docket seems to be chang-
ing . . . A lot of big civil cases are going to arbitration . . . I don’t see as many of the big civil
cases.” Pamela A. MacLean, Justice Kennedy on Vanishing Big Civil Suits, TRIAL INSIDER, (Aug.
16, 2011), http://www.trialinsider.com/?p=639.
16 William M. Landes & Richard Posner, Adjudication as a Private Good, 8 J. LEG. STUD.
235, 236 (1979).
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nalities associated with formal adjudications—Delaware’s thick
common law—are central to the value of Delaware’s corporate law
franchise.17  To the extent that competition for adjudication leads
to a diminution of Delaware’s network, this regime is a potential
threat to Delaware’s competitive position as the competition for
incorporations.
Delaware’s recent move to permit arbitration through the
Chancery Court’s offices, relying on sitting chancellors to act as
neutrals, is largely in response to the perceived threats of competi-
tion from private arbitration.  If the recent movement of parties
away from the formal legal system toward private ordering solu-
tions in other commercial settings is any guide, it is conceivable
that in the not-too-distant future, a substantial number of what are
otherwise matters that might find themselves in front of a Dela-
ware jurist might be decided elsewhere by a private arbitrator.  In-
deed, in its pleadings before the court in the citizens’ challenge and
its public defense, Delaware regularly points to the potential threat
of losing adjudications to arbitrators in New York, London, or Sin-
gapore as a motivation for implementing its court-sponsored pro-
cedure.18  The perceived long-term threat to Delaware’s central
position in the corporate law as a result of adjudications moving
overseas and elsewhere is obvious.
While Delaware’s move to open up the Chancery Court to ar-
bitration may be understandable, it is a controversial step that
raises at least two important questions.  First, notwithstanding a
strong presumption in favor of arbitration, there remain serious
constitutional issues presented by the peculiar form of Delaware’s
arbitration procedure.  The First Amendment generally protects
the right of the public to open courts and access to criminal and
civil trials.19  Without a compelling justification, “agreement of trial
judges and parties cannot constitutionally close a trial to the pub-
lic.”20  The arbitration procedure adopted by the state of Delaware,
which relies on sitting chancellors to hear arbitral cases in confi-
dence that might otherwise be heard in their courtrooms, puts the
state directly in conflict with the First Amendment policy of open-
17 See Michael Klausner, Corporations, Corporate Law, and Networks of Contracts, 81 VA.
L. REV. 757, 841–51 (1995).
18 Brief for NASDAQ OMX Group Inc. & NYSE EuroNext as Amici Curiae Supporting
Respondents at 8, Del. Coal. for Open Gov’t v. Strine, 2012 WL 3744718 (D. Del. Aug. 30, 2012)
(No. 1:11-1015) [hereinafter NASDAQ Amicus Brief].
19 See Richmond Newspapers v. Virginia, 448 U.S. 555 (1980); Publicker Indus., Inc. v. Co-
hen, 733 F.2d 1059, 1070 (1984).
20 Richmond Newspapers, 448 U.S. at 585. (Brennan, J., concurring).
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ness. Indeed, in a citizens’ challenge that is presently pending ap-
peal before the Third Circuit, a federal district court in
Philadelphia ruled that the confidentiality provisions of Delaware’s
arbitration procedure violate this qualified First Amendment pol-
icy of openness.21
Second, even if the new arbitration procedure ultimately with-
stands the constitutional challenge with respect to confidentiality
of its proceedings, it is not clear that a confidential, state-sponsored
arbitration system is in the long-term interests of Delaware and its
corporate law franchise.  Delaware’s value as an incorporation des-
tination stems directly from the value of its network.  Delaware’s
thick corporate common law is regularly held out as a significant
barrier to entry and is important to maintaining Delaware’s com-
petitive position relative to other states that might consider com-
peting for incorporations but do not because of high barriers.22
The prospect of a “Star Chamber” for corporate litigation diverting
what might be a significant portion of the court’s docket into confi-
dential arbitration—though ensuring short-term competitiveness in
the market for adjudications—may well weaken Delaware’s long-
term position in the market for incorporations by diminishing Del-
aware’s production of legal rules. Thus, it is not clear that the sup-
posed benefits of a state-sponsored arbitration system in
maintaining the present caseload outweigh the costs to Delaware’s
network over time through the reduction of rule production.
Finally, the creation of a Chancery-sponsored arbitration pro-
cedure raises normative questions. While it may not be in Dela-
ware’s long-term interest to, in effect, privatize the corporate law,
there is still the question of whether society would be better off if
parties could resolve corporate law questions out of the public eye
through arbitration.23  The answer to this question must be
nuanced.  It is certainly true that contracting parties, including
shareholders and corporations, representing their own interests
should be free to determine the manner and method of dispute
adjudication.  However, it is also true that courts play an important
21 Del. Coal. for Open Gov’t, 2012 WL 3744718. See Tom Hals, Backers of Secret Delaware
Arbitrations See Grounds for Appeal, REUTERS, Sept. 10, 2012, available at http://newsandin-
sight.thomsonreuters.com/Legal/News/2012/09_-_September/Backers_of_secret_Delaware_arbi
trations_see_grounds_for_appeal/.
22 See Daines, supra note 7; Fisch, supra note 9; Kahan & Kamar, supra note 7.
23 Different forms of this normative question have attracted attention over the years. For
example, Professor Fiss sparked a debate within the alternative dispute resolution community
during the mid 1980s on the question of the proper role of alternative forms of adjudication that
lead to settlement. See Fiss, supra note 14.
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role in generating positive externalities through their public
rulemaking, in the absence of which private adjudication might be
less valuable. Delaware’s Chancery-sponsored arbitration proce-
dure threatens to undo that balance, and, as a result, may not be
socially optimal.  This suggests that a balanced approach in which
private arbitration exists side by side with formal adjudication may
be optimal.
This Article proceeds as follows: Part II offers an overview of
recent market developments in the use of arbitration in merger
agreements.  Although most attention with respect to arbitration
deals with the problems of arbitration in the consumer contract
context, relatively little attention has been paid to the role of arbi-
tration in the context of complex contracting in “bet-the-company”
transactions, such as merger agreements.  Part III discusses Dela-
ware’s response to the increased popularity of arbitration and a
rise in the perception that arbitration may be a competitive chal-
lenge to Delaware in the market for adjudications.  The arbitration
procedure adopted by the State of Delaware permits parties to use
the good offices of the state’s court system to confidentially adjudi-
cate disputes.  Part IV introduces a discussion of the constitutional
challenges to Delaware’s new arbitration system and the require-
ments for public access to the courts.  Part V examines Chancery-
sponsored arbitration in the context of Delaware’s network for cor-
porate law.  This Part argues that notwithstanding a constitutional
challenge, Delaware’s state-sponsored arbitration system is bad
public policy because it threatens the long-term value of the state’s
corporate law franchise.  In addition, a state-sponsored system of
private arbitration threatens to upset an important balance be-
tween the public production of legal rules and private adjudication.
As a result, a state-sponsored private system of adjudication may
not be socially optimal when compared to an approach in which
private adjudication sits side-by-side with the public courts.  Part
VI addresses and evaluates the purported advantages of Chancery
arbitration.  In general, the advantages when compared to litiga-
tion before Chancery are few.  To the extent there are advantages,
these advantages are outweighed by the costs they impose on Dela-
ware’s corporate law network.  There are also reasons to believe
that, from a normative perspective, widespread utilization of Chan-
cery arbitration would not be socially optimal.  Part VII summa-
rizes and concludes that if Chancery arbitration is successful, it may
be more of a long-term threat to Delaware’s corporate law
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franchise than the perceived short-term threat it purports to
mitigate.
II. OVERVIEW OF DEVELOPMENTS IN ARBITRATION
Arbitration has a long history in the United States.24  Until the
adoption of the FAA, there was an historical bias against arbitra-
tion by the courts.25  In the FAA, Congress specifically provided
that agreements between parties to enter into arbitration would be
enforceable contractual provisions.26  Over time, the Supreme
Court issued a series of opinions, including Southland Corp. v.
Keating, which made it clear that, in adopting the FAA, the United
States “declared a national policy favoring arbitration and with-
drew the power of the states to require a judicial forum for the
resolution of claims which the contracting parties agreed to resolve
by arbitration.”27  This policy set aside years of anti-arbitration ju-
risprudence in favor of agreements to bring disputes before a pri-
vate arbitrator.  By now the use of arbitration and other non-
traditional dispute resolution mechanisms has become well estab-
lished in the context of consumer, labor, and commercial
contracts.28
The rise of arbitration, particularly in commercial settings, is
not altogether surprising. The courts are notoriously
overburdened, and consequently, the legal system operates at a
slow pace. The prospects of that situation getting any better in
times of fiscal austerity are less than promising.  In addition, com-
mercial disputes are often complex with generalist jurists ill placed
to offer timely decisions without the benefit of a lengthy education
by the parties on the subject matter of the dispute. On the other
hand, private arbitration of commercial disputes offers parties a
number of benefits that are not available through the formal legal
24 See generally John Daly, Arbitration: The Basics, 5 J. AM. ARB. 1 (2006) (providing an
overview of the development of arbitration in the United States).
25 Id. at 7.
26 The FAA pronounced that arbitration agreements between parties “shall be valid, irrevo-
cable, and enforceable, save upon such grounds as exist at law or in equity for the revocation of
any contract.” 9 U.S.C. § 2 (1947).
27 Southland Corp. v. Keating, 465 U.S. 1, 10 (1984). See Allied-Bruce Terminix Cos., Inc. v.
Dobson, 513 U.S. 265, 272 (1995) (citing Southland, 465 U.S. 1); Volt Info. Sciences, Inc. v. Bd.
Of Trustees of Leland Stanford Jr. Univ., 489 U.S. 468, 478 (1989) (citing Southland, 465 U.S. 1).
28 See Daly, supra note 24, at 9.
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system, including speed, expertise of the decision-maker, flexibility,
and confidentiality.
Whereas disputes that enter the formal legal system are re-
quired to queue with potentially a large number of other civil cases
and compete for space on the docket, disputes that are managed
through arbitration can be managed much more quickly.  Because
the parties have the freedom to select an arbitrator of their choos-
ing, parties can select decision-makers who are experts with years
of experience in the field in dispute.  This expertise tends to elimi-
nate the process of educating the decision-maker speeds up resolu-
tion of the dispute.  Moreover, parties have significant flexibility in
the design of the arbitral procedure, which can also aid in speeding
the process.  Arbitrators need not follow the same procedures as
courts, permitting parties to expedite or limit discovery, modify
rules of evidence and move more quickly than a court to a substan-
tive decision on the merits.29  Arbitrators selected by the parties
are often only required to provide a resolution to the dispute
before them and are not required to create, or necessarily adhere,
to precedent.30  Arbitrators’ decisions can be extremely brief, pro-
viding only a “yes” or a “no” or a dollar amount, and not a lengthy
opinion.31  This can expedite the process of dispute resolution
considerably.
Some studies have found arbitration to be more common be-
tween parties who have ongoing business relationships that they
wish to preserve.32  This suggests that arbitration is less confronta-
tional than litigation in the courts.33  Professors Christopher
Drahozal and Stephen Ware suggest that businesses will tend to
rely on arbitration in routine, small-stakes contracts, transnational
contracts, and in contract situations where parties wish to maintain
ongoing relationships.  On the other hand, in high-stakes, “bet-the-
company” litigation, they suggest parties are much less likely to
rely on arbitration.34  Because of their informal nature, arbitration
proceedings can be kept confidential, thus protecting parties from
potentially embarrassing disclosures.  The ability of parties to
29 See Nat’l Arb. Forum, Business-to-Business Mediation/Arbitration vs. Litigation (Jan.
2005) at 5.
30 Id.
31 Soia Mentschikoff, Commercial Arbitration, 61 COLUM. L. REV. 846, 866 (1961).
32 Christopher R. Drahozal & Stephen J. Ware, Why Do Businesses Use (or Not Use) Arbi-
tration Clauses?, 25 OHIO ST. J. ON DISP. RES. 433, 452 (2010).
33 Nat’l Arb. Forum, supra note 29, at 8.
34 Drahozal & Ware, supra note 32, at 452–56.
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maintain confidentiality with respect to the content of their dis-
putes may also play a role in reducing the level of confrontation.35
Although arbitration has been generally recognized as more
flexible, and even more efficient, for disputants than formal litiga-
tion, the prevalence of arbitration provisions in business-to-busi-
ness commercial contracts is not universal in all contractual
settings.36  In fact, in a 2006 study of 2,800 public company con-
tracts, Professors Theodore Eisenberg and Geoffrey Miller found
that about eleven percent of all contracts in their sample included
an arbitration provision.37  Eisenberg and Miller found a greater
prevalence of arbitration provisions when there was at least one
international party, suggesting that the great certainty of enforce-
ment of international arbitral awards is attractive for international
parties.38  Reliance on arbitration provisions in employment, li-
censing, and franchise settings is also relatively high, supporting the
belief that arbitration can be valuable in supporting relational con-
tracts.39  The evidence with respect to the reliance on arbitration
provisions in merger agreements is mixed.  Eisenberg and Miller
report arbitration provisions in 18.98 percent of merger agreements
in their sample.40
In a subsequent study of merger agreements involving publicly
traded targets, Professors Matthew Cain and Steven Davidoff
found that only two merger agreements of a sample of 1,020 (or 0.2
percent) include arbitration provisions.41  Cain and Davidoff state
that the discrepancy in the prevalence of arbitration provisions in
their sample is likely due to differences in sampling.  A more re-
cent study of merger agreements by Professor John Coates suggests
this interpretation is likely correct.  In a sample of public and pri-
vate targets from 2007 and 2008, Professor Coates finds arbitration
provisions governing contract disputes in twenty percent of trans-
35 Id. at 452.
36 See Landes & Posner, supra note 16 (arguing that if private adjudication is efficient, more
will adopt it).
37 Theodore Eisenberg & Geoffrey P. Miller, The Flight From Arbitration: An Empirical
Study of Ex Ante Arbitration Clauses in the Contracts of Publicly Held Companies, 56 DEPAUL
L. REV. 335, 336 (2007).
38 Id. at 342, 351.
39 Id. at 347, 350 (citing Christopher R. Drahozal & Keith N. Hylton, The Economics of
Litigation and Arbitration: An Application to Franchise Contracts, 32 J. LEGAL STUD. 549, 575
(2003)).
40 Id. at 351.
41 Matthew D. Cain & Steven M. Davidoff, Delaware’s Competitive Reach, 9 J. EMP. LEG.
STUD. 92, 105 (2012).
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actions for private targets and in two percent of transactions for
publicly traded targets.42
A review of transactions from 2009–2011, during a period that
overlaps with the implementation of Delaware’s Chancery-spon-
sored arbitration procedure, confirms observations by Cain and
Davidoff and Coates.43  Of the 248 transactions in the sample there
is a clear bias in favor of both Delaware law to govern disputes
over the merger contract (96%) and the Delaware judiciary to be
the forum for the adjudication of disputes (84%). Only two trans-
actions in the sample (less than 1%) opted for arbitration in any
form, and both of those transactions opted for the new Delaware
Chancery arbitration procedure.
Governing Law Forum
DE 238 95.97% DE 209 84.27%
NY 6 2.42% NY 8 3.23%
Other 4 1.61% Other location 5 2.02%
Total 248 100.00% Arbitration 0 0.00%
Arbitration in DE 2 0.81%
Nothing 24 9.68%
Total 248 100.00%
It is clear from this data, as well as from the data presented by
Cain and Davidoff and Coates, that the perception of arbitration as
anything other than a long-term threat to the Delaware market for
adjudications is likely mislaid.  Although businesses appear happy
to rely on arbitration in the consumer and employment contexts,
consistent with observations by Professors Drahozal and Hylton,
there is little or no evidence—notwithstanding the results of Eisen-
berg and Miller—that firms are presently seeking to exit the formal
legal system in favor of private arbitration in large “bet-the-com-
pany” transactions.  There is even less evidence to support the con-
tention that United States firms are seeking to have merger-related
disputes adjudicated overseas.  Chancery arbitration may be, it
turns out, a solution in search of a problem.  If the procedure does
not take hold, that might not be much of a concern. However, if
42 John C. Coates, The Powerful and Persuasive Effects of Ownership on M&A (2012), avail-
able at ssrn.com/abstract=1544500.  Professors Coates found a larger percentage of merger
agreements included arbitration provisions for resolution of post-closing disputes over price ad-
justments (twenty-five percent for publicly traded targets and eighty-nine percent for private
targets). Id. at 24.
43 A search of the SDC Thomson Database for transactions announced between Jan. 1, 2009
and Dec. 31, 2011 greater than $100 million in value involving Delaware targets not in bank-
ruptcy turns up 248 deals.
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the procedure becomes a popular alternative to formal adjudica-
tion, then it could pose a challenge to the viability of Delaware’s
franchise.
III. DELAWARE’S ARBITRATION PROCEDURE
The question of competition for corporate law and Delaware’s
role in competing with other states for incorporations has been
well studied.44  While state competition for incorporations may
once have been robust, by now such competition is more theoreti-
cal than real.  Delaware has by far the largest share of out-of-state
incorporations.  To the extent there is any remaining competition
for incorporations, it is bi-modal in nature: Delaware competes for
re-incorporations with the state in which firms are physically lo-
cated.  Notwithstanding efforts by states like California and New
York to the contrary, there is almost no real competition between
Delaware and third states for incorporations of firms.45
Rather, as others have previously noted, Delaware’s most sali-
ent source of potential competition comes from the federal govern-
ment, not for incorporations, but rather in the corporate
governance sphere.46  While the federal government has the power
to preempt the question of state law dominance over incorpora-
tions, it has opted not to.  Rather, it has largely, but not entirely,
left the question of the internal governance of the firm to the
states.47  Over the years, and especially since the adoption of the
Sarbanes-Oxley legislation in 2002, the federal government has
44 See Lucian A. Bebchuk & Alma Cohen, Firms’ Decisions Where to Incorporate, 46 J.L. &
ECON. 383 (2003); Lucian A. Bebchuk & Assaf Hamdani, Vigorous Race or Leisurely Walk:
Reconsidering the Competition over Corporate Charters, 112 YALE L.J. 553 (2002); William L.
Cary, Federalism and Corporate Law: Reflections Upon Delaware, 83 YALE L.J. 663 (1974);
Kahan & Kamar, supra note 7; Ehud Kamar, A Regulatory Competition Theory of Indeterminacy
in Corporate Law, 98 COLUM. L. REV. 1908 (1998); Roberta Romano, The State Competition
Debate in Corporate Law, 8 CARDOZO L. REV. 709 (1987); Roberta Romano, Competition for
Corporate Charters and the Lesson of Takeover Statutes, 61 FORDHAM L. REV. 843 (1993);
Guhan Subramanian, The Influence of Antitakeover Statutes on Incorporation Choice: Evidence
on the “Race” Debate and Antitakeover Overreaching, 150 U. PA. L. REV. 1795 (2002); Winter,
supra note 6.
45 See Daines, supra note 7, at 1573–74.
46 Roe, supra note 8, at 593, 600. See generally Renee Jones, Does Federalism Matter? Its
Perplexing Role in the Corporate Governance Debate, 41 WAKE FOREST L. REV. 879 (2006);
Jones, supra note 8; Marcel Kahan & Edward Rock, Symbiotic Federalism and the Structure of
Corporate Law, 58 VAND. L. REV. 1573, 1576, 1578–90 (2005); Brett H. McDonnell, Two Cheers
for Corporate Law Federalism, 30 J. CORP. L. 99 (2004).
47 See Edgar v. Mite Corp., 457 U.S. 624 (1982).
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made episodic forays into the question of corporate governance.48
These interventions have largely been in response to perceived na-
tional problems related to corporate governance and performance
of the corporate sector.  For example, Sarbanes-Oxley was adopted
in the wake of the dot com bubble and the accounting scandals of
the early 2000s.  The more recent Dodd-Frank Act, with its corpo-
rate governance provisions, was also adopted in response to the
bursting of the credit bubble in 2007. The responsive approach to
corporate governance interventions has been criticized by some
observers for its incoherence.49
Delaware is sensitive to its position vis-a-vis the federal gov-
ernment and is highly responsive to moves that might impinge on
its position.  For example, in 2006, in response to potential move-
ment by the Securities and Exchange Commission (“SEC”) on the
question of majority voting for directors, the Delaware legislature
amended §216 of the Delaware General Corporation Code to pro-
vide that, where shareholders approve a bylaw amendment requir-
ing majority voting for directors, the directors may not further
amend such bylaws.50  Delaware has taken similar steps with re-
spect to shareholder proxy access by adopting private ordering so-
lutions, like §112, in order to head off potential top-down
governance interventions threatened by the SEC.51 Delaware’s re-
sponsiveness to potential federal government action suggests that
competition, or at least the threat of competition, in corporate gov-
ernance is perceived to be real.  Rather than sit idly on its market-
leading position, Delaware is highly attuned to the tension that ex-
ists between it and other players in the governance sphere, and will
take steps to reform its governance mechanisms when it senses a
potential threat to its position on the horizon.52
In recent years, a new sphere for competition with Delaware
has developed: the market for adjudications.  To the extent adjudi-
cations play an important role in creating legal precedents and thus
maintaining and developing a thick corporate common law, Dela-
ware’s continued ability to adjudicate corporate law disputes
48 See Roe, supra note 98, at 597–8; Jones, supra note 46, at 887.
49 See Jones, supra note 46, at 882–88; Roberta Romano, The Sarbanes-Oxley Act and the
Making of Quack Corporate Governance, 114 YALE L.J. 1521 (2005).
50 DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 8, § 216 (2006).
51 DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 8, § 112 (2008) (permitting firms to adopt bylaws that provide share-
holders, under certain circumstances, the right to nominate directors and have access to the
proxy).
52 Roe, supra note 8. See Jones, supra note 46; Kahan & Rock, supra note 46; McDonnell,
supra note 46.
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before its Chancery Court plays an important role in maintaining
its franchise.  The specialized Chancery Court is one of the sources
of Delaware’s competitive advantage in corporate law.  Professors
John Armour, Bernard Black and Brian Cheffins observed a rela-
tively recent trend of plaintiffs bringing shareholder litigation
outside the state of Delaware and its Chancery Court.53  The fact
that an increasingly large number of litigants would bring claims
away from the Delaware Chancery Court by pursuing multi-forum
litigation strategies raises questions about Delaware’s ability to
maintain barriers to entry that help maintain its position against
potential competition.54
Unlike corporate law, the market for adjudication appears to
be more open to competition.  In recent years, nineteen states have
established specialized business litigation courts.55  In New York,
the establishment of the Commercial Division of the New York Su-
preme Court was intended to put New York at the center of the
market for adjudications.56  In fact, in 2012, the Chief Judge of New
York, Jonathan Lippman, created a Task Force with the goal of
ensuring that New York’s courts remain at the forefront of the
market for adjudication of commercial disputes.57  In other states,
the focus of developing specialized business courts was clearly “de-
fensive competition” in response to lobbying by local businesses to
prevent them from exiting the state’s court system for other
forums.58
Non-traditional dispute resolution procedures, like private ar-
bitration, also raise potential competitive issues with respect to
Delaware.  To the extent parties opt to exit the formal legal system
to have their disputes resolved through arbitration or mediation,
53 Armour, Black, & Cheffins, supra note 10, at 1353–63.
54 See Quinn, supra note 10, at 139.
55 “In 1993, business courts were established in New York and Illinois. In the years to follow,
business courts were created in North Carolina (1995), New Jersey (1996), Pennsylvania (2000),
Massachusetts (2000), Nevada (2000), Rhode Island (2001), Maryland (2003), Florida (2004),
Georgia (2005), Oregon (2006), Colorado (2006), South Carolina (2007), Maine (2008), New
Hampshire (2008), Alabama (2009), Ohio (2009), and Delaware (2010).” John F. Coyle, Business
Courts and Interstate Competition, 53 WM. & MARY L. REV. 1915, 1918 (2012).
56 THE CHIEF JUDGE’S TASK FORCE ON COMMERCIAL LITIGATION IN THE 21ST CENTURY
(June 2012) [hereinafter TASK FORCE].
57 Id. at 1.
58 Kahan & Kamar, supra note 7, at 699. See also Business Courts May Help West Virginia
Compete, CHARLESTON DAILY MAIL, Sept. 13, 2012 available at http://www.dailymail.com/Opin-
ion/Editorials/201209120220.
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exit forms another locus of potential competition for Delaware.59
In recent years, the potential for competition with the Delaware
Chancery Court engendered by informal processes has attracted
the attention of Delaware policymakers who have responded in
kind.  In 1994, Delaware created “summary proceedings” in an at-
tempt to bridge the gap between private arbitration and traditional
litigation.60  Then, in 2003, Delaware adopted a mediation-only de-
vice in an attempt to provide still more flexibility for parties bring-
ing cases before the Delaware courts.61  In 2010, Delaware created
yet another forum for adjudication of business disputes when it es-
tablished a new Complex Commercial Litigation Division in its Su-
perior Court to hear commercial contract disputes.62 All three of
these devices were adopted in an attempt to improve the competi-
tiveness of Delaware relative to new private alternatives in the
market for adjudications.
In 2009, in response to perceived threats to Delaware’s posi-
tion stemming from informal adjudication procedures like arbitra-
tion, the Delaware legislature made additional amendments to
Title 10 related to the powers and jurisdiction of the Chancery
Court.  That the legislative record is sparse with respect to the leg-
islative history for this amendment speaks to the consensus-ori-
ented process that governs legislative changes with respect to the
Delaware corporate law. The amendments, supported by the Dela-
ware Bar Association’s committee on the corporate law, were
adopted by the Delaware legislature without debate. Ex post ratio-
nalizations for the law suggest that the corporate law community in
Delaware believed that adoption of the Delaware arbitration pro-
cedure was necessary to head off potential competition from pri-
vate arbitrators in the corporate law space. The new §349 provides:
(a) The Court of Chancery shall have the power to arbitrate
business disputes when the parties request a member of the
Court of Chancery, or such other person as may be authorized
under rules of the Court, to arbitrate a dispute.
59 ALBERT O. HIRSCHMAN, EXIT, VOICE, AND LOYALTY (1970) (observing the competitive
effect of exit in governance).
60 See Brenda G. Houck, Recent Developments in Delaware Corporate Law: 1994 Statutory
Amendments to the Delaware General Corporation Law, 20 DEL. J. CORP. L. 477, 477–87 (1995).
61 Leo E. Strine, Jr., “Mediation-Only” Filings in the Delaware Court of Chancery: Can New
Value be Added by One of America’s Business Courts?, 53 DUKE L. REV. 585, 585 (2003) (noting
the mediation-only device was enacted into law as §§346 and 347 of Title 10 of the Delaware
Code).
62 DEL ST. CTS., SUPER. CT. COMPLEX COMMERCIAL LITIG. DIV., available at http://courts.
delaware.gov/Superior/complex.stm.
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(b) Arbitration proceedings shall be considered confidential
and not of public record until such time, if any, as the proceed-
ings are the subject of an appeal. In the case of an appeal, the
record shall be filed by the parties with the  Supreme Court in
accordance with its rules, and to the extent applicable, the rules
of the Court of Chancery.63
Although parties have the right to appeal arbitral proceedings to
the Delaware Supreme Court under §349, such appeals are subject
to a voluntary ex ante waiver; thus it is possible to use the Chancery
Court’s offices, with a sitting chancellor or vice chancellor acting as
arbitrator, to conduct a confidential, non-appealable arbitration
proceeding.64
The availability of this new Chancery Court-sponsored arbitra-
tion procedure is not universal. The arbitration procedure requires
that both parties consent to arbitration over mediation and that at
least one party be a business incorporated in Delaware.65  Parties
have limited rights with respect to arbitral remedies; unlike the
Chancery Court’s typical jurisdiction, the arbitration procedure
only provides for cash damages (minimum of one million dollars),
and not equitable remedies.66  Of course, parties are free to re-
write the powers of the arbitrator in any manner that suits them.67
This includes granting the arbitrator the right to exercise equitable
powers. In both transactions in the author’s sample the parties
granted the arbitrator the right to fashion any remedy that the arbi-
ter deemed appropriate.
The Chancery Court arbitration procedure also ensures confi-
dentiality for the parties.68  Parties are responsible for paying costs,
including an arbitration fee.69  Parties can agree to an ex ante
waiver of their right to appeal to the Delaware Supreme Court, in
which case the decision of the chancellor arbitrator is final.70  In
the event parties do not waive their rights to appeal the arbitral
decision and they opt to appeal, the appeal is limited by the FAA
63 DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 10, § 349 (2012).
64 See DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 10, § 351 (2012).
65 DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 10, § 349(a) (2012). No party to the arbitration may be a “consumer”
as defined in Sec. 2731 of tit. 6 of the Del. Code §.2731 defines a consumer as “an individual who
purchases or leases merchandise primarily for personal, family or household purposes.” This
definition would exclude most, if not all, stockholders if arbitration were to be applied to them
as stockholders.
66 Id. 
67 DEL. CH. R. 98(f).
68 DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 10, § 349(b) (2012).
69 DEL. CH. R. 98(g).
70 DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 10, § 349(c) (2012).
\\jciprod01\productn\C\CAC\14-3\CAC309.txt unknown Seq: 16 23-APR-13 8:36
844 CARDOZO J. OF CONFLICT RESOLUTION [Vol. 14:829
to questions about whether the arbitration provision was properly
entered into by the parties and not the substance of the arbitration
proceedings.71
This new Chancery-sponsored arbitration procedure is unique
to Delaware. Although there are numerous examples of court-an-
nexed arbitration programs throughout the United States, such
programs are different from the Chancery-sponsored arbitration
procedure. First, these court-annexed arbitration procedures are, in
their essence, diversion programs intended to move simple cases of
relatively low values out of the formal legal system.72  The purpose
of the Chancery Court-sponsored procedure is to deter parties
from bringing claims in arbitration in other forums outside of Dela-
ware.  Rather than be a diversion program and reduce the load on
the courts, Delaware’s arbitration program is intended to attract
additional parties to Delaware as an adjudication destination.  Del-
aware hopes to attract new adjudications, or to at least prevent
parties who might traditionally adjudicate in Delaware from leav-
ing the jurisdiction for other forums.
Second, arbitrators in more traditional court-annexed arbitra-
tion programs are typically members of the bar, retired judges, or
specialists and not, as in Delaware, sitting judges.73  Because tradi-
tional court-annexed programs are intended to be diversion pro-
grams, the use of attorneys and retired judges rather than sitting
judges reduces the case-load of the formal court system and im-
proves the ability of the formal legal system to resolve the cases
that remain in the docket.  On the other hand, the Chancery Court
program adds to the court’s case-load by requiring sitting judges to
act as private arbitrators, thus raising their prospective caseload.
Indeed, the prospect of having sitting judges available to resolve
controversies is intended to provide prospective parties with confi-
dence that the matter will be resolved by an expert adjudicator.
The use of sitting judges rather than private experts is, in the design
71 Id. In arguments before the Federal district court in Philadelphia, the Delaware State Bar
Association’s amicus brief stated that appeals would be limited by the FAA’s limitations on
appellate review of arbitration decisions. That is, such appeals would be limited to reviews of the
parties’ agreement to arbitrate. Brief for the Delaware Bar Association as Amici Curiae Sup-
porting Respondents, Del. Coal. for Open Gov’t v. Strine, 2012 WL 3744718 (D. Del. Aug. 30,
2012) (No. 1:11-1015) [hereinafter Del. Bar Ass’n Amicus Brief]. See David Horton, Federal
Arbitration Act Preemption: Purposivism and State Public Policy, 101 GEO. L.J. (forthcoming
2013) (discussing FAA limits on parties’ right to appeal arbitration decisions).
72 PATRICIA A. EBENER & DONNA R. BETANCOURT, COURT-ANNEXED ARBITRATION: THE
NATIONAL PICTURE (Instit. for Civil Justice, Feb. 1985); BARBARA S. MEIERHOFER, COURT-
ANNEXED ARBITRATION IN TEN DISTRICT COURTS (Fed. Judicial Ctr. 1990).
73 EBENER & BETANCOURT, supra note 72; MEIERHOFER, supra note 72.
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of the Chancery arbitration procedure, a “feature” rather than a
“bug.”
Finally, cases in court-annexed arbitration programs typically
rely on case managers to identify matters eligible for diversion into
the program.  Case managers are instructed to divert small cases
with relatively straightforward issues.74  On the other hand, the
Chancery Court procedure does not rely on a case manager to de-
cide which cases to resolve through arbitration; the parties them-
selves must elect through contract to pursue arbitration. With
respect to appropriate matters, rather than limit the size at risk, the
Chancery Court requires that the amount in controversy be at least
one million dollars.  That is to say, it demonstrates a bias towards
larger controversies. Though diversion programs limit themselves
to relatively simple sets of facts, there are no limits with respect to
the complexity of the facts at issue in the Chancery Court
procedure.
The Chancery-sponsored arbitration program is also different
in kind from court-sponsored mediation programs, including Dela-
ware’s court-sponsored mediation program.  In mediation pro-
grams, parties agree to participate in confidential proceedings that
rely on the court’s good offices, and, in Delaware, a chancellor of
the court.  However, mediation and other court-sponsored settle-
ment procedures by their nature lack the coercive force of either
formal adjudication or arbitration.  Parties in these procedures al-
ways reserve the right to pursue litigation in the event they are
unhappy with the result of the mediation or settlement.  This mea-
sure of background voluntariness is absent when parties agree to
arbitration.
Although intended for large commercial contracts like merg-
ers, the Delaware arbitral program has the potential for bigger and
potentially unanticipated effects if it finds purchase in corporate
formation documents and then in shareholder litigation.  While
perhaps not initially intended as a device for firms to resolve share-
holder disputes, it is entirely possible following a policy change at
the SEC that Chancery-sponsored arbitration could come into
widespread use as a method for stemming shareholder litigation.
In recent years, transaction-related litigation has become a
regular landmark of the deal-making cycle.75  By some estimates,
more than eighty percent of merger transactions are accompanied
74 EBENER & BETANCOURT, supra note 72; MEIERHOFER, supra note 72.
75 Armour, Black, & Cheffins, supra note 10.
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by some form of shareholder litigation.76  Arbitration provisions in-
cluded in a merger agreement cannot prevent shareholders from
bringing transaction-related lawsuits before a court since share-
holders are not bound by the merger contract’s limitation in pursu-
ing arbitration as a proper forum.  If, however, agreements to
arbitrate are included as forum-selection provisions in corporate
charters, then the Chancery arbitration procedure may also include
shareholder litigation.77  If it does, it has the potential to signifi-
cantly impact the development of the corporate law over time.
To date, the SEC has not permitted firms to go public with
arbitration provisions in their certificates of incorporation.78  Such
provisions would, in the opinion of SEC staff, violate the anti-
waiver provisions of §14 of the Securities Act and §29(a) of the
Securities Exchange Act.79  The anti-waiver provisions prohibit
parties from entering into contracts or agreements that might pur-
port to waive any provisions of the securities acts.80  The SEC staff
has maintained the position that arbitration provisions are a
waiver, and thus invalid.  However, the Supreme Court has been
consistent in its policy, “requiring a liberal reading of arbitration
agreements,” and maintaining “that as a matter of federal law, any
doubts concerning the scope of arbitral issues should be resolved in
favor of arbitration.”81  This liberal policy with respect to arbitra-
tion suggests that if the SEC were forced by a change in adminis-
tration to reconsider its present policy with respect to arbitration
provisions that it could do an about face.  In addition, the SEC
already permits forum selection clauses in charters that purport to
limit shareholders to Delaware or other preferred forums.  Thus,
there is increasingly little reason to expect that the SEC’s aversion
to arbitration will survive indefinitely into the future.  If the SEC
were to reverse its present position, it is possible that firms would
rapidly adopt such provisions in their charter documents and, as a
76 Id.
77 Jennifer Johnson & Edward Brunet, Arbitration of Shareholder Claims: Why Change is
Not Always a Measure of Progress (Lewis & Clark Law School, Working Paper No. 2008-11, 15-
16), available at ssrn.com/abstract=1112826.
78 See Steven M. Davidoff, Carlyle Readies an Unfriendly I.P.O. for Shareholders, THE N.Y.
TIMES (Jan. 18, 2012), http://dealbook.nytimes.com/2012/01/18/carlyle-readies-an-unfriendly-i-p-
o-for-shareholders/.
79 Barbara Black, Can Behavioral Economics Inform Our Understanding of Securities Arbi-
tration?, CINCINNATI LAW WORKING PAPER SERIES, 11-13 (Aug. 1, 2011), at 3.
80 See generally Samuel H. Gruenbaum, Avoiding the Protections of the Federal Securities
Laws: The Anti-Waiver Provisions, 20 SANTA CLARA L. REV. 49 (1980).
81 Moses H. Cone Mem’l Hosp. v. Mercury Constr. Corp., 460 U.S. 1, 24–5 (1983).
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consequence, shift a considerable amount of shareholder litigation
to arbitration.82
IV. CONSTITUTIONAL CHALLENGES TO DELAWARE’S
ARBITRATION SYSTEM
Delaware’s peculiar arbitration system raises a serious consti-
tutional question: may the State sponsor a confidential system of
dispute adjudication that relies on sitting state judges hearing mat-
ters identical to those that they would otherwise hear through the
formal legal system?  Not long after the Skyworks/AATI dispute
was made public, the Delaware Coalition for Open Government
(“DCOG”) filed suit arguing that the confidentiality afforded to
parties through the Chancery-sponsored arbitration system was un-
constitutional because it denied the public access to the proceed-
ings.83  The DCOG argued successfully in federal district court that
the Chancery-sponsored arbitration system violated a First
Amendment policy of open access to the courts.84  Notwithstanding
its failure to pass constitutional muster before a district court, and
a pending appeal before the United States Court of Appeals for
the Third Circuit, backers of Chancery arbitration seek to recon-
figure the procedure and pursue it in an alternate form.85
Proponents of Delaware’s Chancery-sponsored arbitration
procedure hail it as an important tool in ensuring that Delaware
remains a competitive locus for adjudications competing with pri-
vate arbitration.  Central to this competitiveness argument is the
fact that the new Chancery-sponsored arbitration procedure pro-
vides parties with access to Delaware’s stable of highly expert
judges, while ensuring the results of the arbitration remain confi-
dential.86  Proponents of the arbitration program point to the im-
portance of confidentiality in maintaining a competitive position
relative to private arbitration, which is typically confidential in na-
82 See generally Robert Daines & Michael Klausner, Do IPO Charters Maximize Firm
Value? Antitakeover Protection in IPOs, 17 JLEO 83 (2001) (observing that many firms go pub-
lic with less than efficient terms notwithstanding predictions that they should only go public with
efficient terms)
83 Complaint, Del. Coal. for Open Gov’t v. Strine, 2012 WL 3744718 (D. Del. Aug. 30, 2012)
(No. 1:11-1015).
84 Del. Coal. for Open Gov’t, 2012 WL 3744718.
85 Hals, supra note 21.
86 Del. Bar Ass’n Amicus Brief, supra note 71.
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ture.87 However, the provision for the broad protections of confi-
dentiality for the arbitration proceedings places it squarely at odds
with long-held notions of openness of court proceedings and a
qualified First Amendment right of public access to the courts.
The U.S. Supreme Court has long adhered to an interpretation
of the First Amendment application that requires the public and
press have open access to the courts.  In Richmond Newspapers v.
Virginia,88 the trial judge in a criminal case cleared the court of
non-parties and witnesses on a defense motion.  The prosecution
did not object to the defense motion and deferred to the court’s
decision.  A local newspaper challenged the court’s decision to
close the courtroom arguing that, notwithstanding an agreement
between the defense and the prosecution to close the courtroom
from outsiders, the public through the press had the right to access
the proceeding.  On appeal, the U.S. Supreme Court agreed with
the newspaper and announced a First Amendment policy of the
presumption of open access to criminal trials.89  The Richmond
Newspapers court noted that traditional public access to the com-
mon law courts was “one of the essential qualities of a court of
justice.”90  This policy of openness was brought over to the colo-
nies. In its decision, the Court cited the 1677 Concessions and
Agreements of West New Jersey, which provided:
That in all public courts of justice for trials of causes, civil or
criminal, any person or persons, inhabitants of the said Province
may freely come into, and attend the said courts, and hear and
be present, at all or any such trials as shall be there had or
passed, that justice may not be done in a corner nor in any cov-
ert manner.91
The presumption of openness of the courts is thus engrained in
the tradition of the common law system in the United States.  In-
deed, the law-making role of the courts requires public access to
them in order to ensure their legitimacy over the long run.  As the
court in Richmond Newspaper noted, “[p]eople in an open society
do not demand infallibility from their institutions, but it is difficult
for them to accept what they are prohibited from observing.”92
87 Id.; NASDAQ Amicus Brief, supra note 18, at 6–7. See also Peg Brickley, Secrecy Puts
Judges on Defense in Delaware, WALL ST. J. (Feb. 21, 2012), http://online.wsj.com/article/SB1000
1424052970204131004577235240702540000.html.
88 448 U.S. 555 (1980).
89 Id.
90 Id. at 567 (citing Daubney v. Cooper, 10 B. & C. 237, 240 (K. B. 1829)).
91 Id. (citing R. PERRY, Ed., SOURCES OF OUR LIBERTIES 188 (1959)).
92 Id. at 572.
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The role of public access is therefore critical to the development of
the common law.
Of course, there are a number of settings where the proper
functioning of the courts and public access are not altogether ap-
propriate, such as in the context of grand juries or jury delibera-
tions.93  Before a “qualified First Amendment right of access”
attaches to a particular court proceeding, two factors must be con-
sidered: First is “whether the place and process have historically
been open to the press and general public.”94  The more experience
with openness with respect to the particular place and process, the
more likely it is that this experience factor will lean in favor of
openness.  “The experience factor considers whether there is a ‘tra-
dition of accessibility’ attendant to a given place and process.”95
Second is the “logic” factor, which “asks whether public access
plays a significant positive role in the functioning of the particular
process in question.”96  One can well imagine that public access
into jury deliberations or grand jury proceedings might well nega-
tively affect the functioning of the process of fact determination.
On the other hand, public access to the court’s rationalization of
the verdict could play a very valuable role in improving consistency
of outcomes.
Although the Supreme Court has never directly reached the
question of whether the qualified First Amendment right of access
reaches civil proceedings, all the circuits that have heard the ques-
tion (with the exception of the D.C. Circuit) have extended the
qualified First Amendment right of access to civil cases as well.97
For example, in Publicker Industries, Inc. v. Cohen,98 the Third Cir-
cuit was asked to rule on a question of first impression in that cir-
cuit: “Does the First Amendment secure to the public and to the
press a right of access to civil proceedings?”99  In Publicker, mem-
bers of the media objected to the decision by a judge in the Dela-
ware Orphans Court (precursor to the Delaware Chancery Court)
93 Press-Enter. v. Super. Ct., 478 U.S. 1, 9 (1986).
94 Id. at 8.
95 Id.
96 Id. at 9.
97 Ronald D. May, Public Access to Civil Court Records: A Common Law Approach, 39
VAND. L. REV. 1465, 1478 (1986); Mary-Rose Papandrea, Under Attack: The Public’s Right to
Know and the War on Terror, 25 B.C. THIRD WORLD L.J. 35, 47 (2005) (citing Eugene Cerruti,
“Dancing in the Courthouse”: The First Amendment Right of Access Opens a New Round, 29 U.
RICH. L. REV. 237, 263 (1995)).
98 Publicker Indus., Inc. v. Cohen, 733 F.2d 1059 (3d Cir. 1984).
99 Id. at 1061.
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to close proceedings in shareholder litigation to members of the
media.  The judge closed the hearing to all except the parties, their
counsel, and witnesses, due to the sensitive nature of the informa-
tion to be discussed and because the nature of the hearing was to
determine whether such information should be subject to a protec-
tive order.100  Members of the media challenged the order, arguing
that the qualified First Amendment right recognized in Richmond
Newspapers and its progeny extend the policy of openness to civil
as well as criminal trials.
In extending the qualified First Amendment right of access to
civil cases, the Publicker court dealt with the most serious objec-
tion to the right of access in the civil context: the fact that two
parties to a civil case may wish to adjudicate their civil matter in
private.  The justification of openness where one party to the pro-
ceeding is exercising governmental police powers against a citizen
is obvious—the fact that the public may observe the actions of the
government and the court ensures against over-reach and instills
confidence in the integrity of the judicial system.101  Citing Justice
Oliver Wendell Holmes, the Publicker court noted the desirability
of public civil trials:
Not because the controversies of one citizen with another are of
public concern, but because it is of the highest moment that
those who administer justice should always act under the sense
of public responsibility, and that every citizen should be able to
satisfy himself with his own eyes as to the mode in which a pub-
lic duty is performed.102
It is precisely because openness can instill confidence in the
operation of the courts for non-participants that it is important to
maintain openness, even where there are only private parties in-
volved and the government is not a party.  In civil cases, it is the
ability of the courts to demonstrate even-handedness in the resolu-
tion of disputes between private parties that is the function worth
protecting.  By instilling and reinforcing public confidence in the
ability of courts to operate, openness increases the value of public
courts for third parties.
100 Id. at 1062.
101 The Supreme Court’s recognition of a First Amendment right of access to criminal trials is
predicated on the common understanding that “the core purpose of the First Amendment is to
assure freedom of communication on matters relating to the functioning of government.” Id. at
1067 (1984) (citing Globe Newspaper Co. v. Sup. Ct., 457 U.S. at 575, 604). See Richmond News-
papers, 448 U.S. 555 (1980).
102 733 F.2d at 1061 (citing Cowley v. Pulsifer, 137 Mass. 392, 394 (Mass. 1884)).
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Once the qualified First Amendment right of access has at-
tached, parties seeking to close presumptively open proceedings
must establish “an overriding interest based on findings that clo-
sure is essential to preserve higher values and is narrowly tailored
to serve that interest.”103  Courts have held that there are various
categories of witnesses who have a privacy interest paramount to
the qualified First Amendment right of access, including victims of
sex crimes and criminal informants, and permit closure of the court
record with respect to their identities.104  For example, in Catholic
Diocese of Wilmington, Inc., a federal bankruptcy court recognized
a “common law right of access” in civil proceedings in determining
whether certain personnel records related to the sexual abuse of
minors would be subject to public disclosure.105  A closure in such a
case would recognize the “higher values” associated with, for in-
stance, releasing the identities of abused victims as compared to
the public’s qualified right of access. The court may issue a protec-
tive order “narrowly tailored to serve that interest” without com-
promising the greater principle of open access.106  Through the use
of narrowly tailored protective orders, courts can balance the inter-
est in openness with the interests of the parties in maintaining at
least some degree of confidentiality without sacrificing the impor-
tant contributions that openness generates for the judicial system.
We must also consider the role of confidentiality. Confidenti-
ality of the proceedings is the key attribute of the Chancery Court’s
arbitration procedure.  However, if one applies the two-factor test
to the typical case that one might expect to be heard by the Chan-
cery Court, it is difficult to make a compelling argument against
the presumption of a qualified First Amendment right of access.
The mere fact that parties have elected to pursue voluntary arbitra-
tion through the courts should not be sufficient to restrict public
access to the proceedings.  The types of cases that one expects will
avail themselves of the Chancery Court’s arbitration program (e.g.
contract disputes and shareholder litigation) are not the types of
cases where one expects there to be compelling governmental in-
103 Press Enter. v. Sup.Ct., 464 U.S. 501, 510 (1984).
104 U.S. v. Ignasiak, 667 F.3d 1217 (11th Cir. 2012) (declining to find a compelling interest in
protecting the privacy of an expert witness’ fee).
105 In re Catholic Diocese of Wilmington, Inc., Case No. 09-13560 (CSS) (June 20, 2012) (J.
Sontchi).
106 In Catholic Diocese of Wilmington, Inc., the Court acknowledged the public interest in the
Diocese case, in particular, where “[t]he very heart of the heavily negotiated Non-Monetary
Provisions was and is to shed light on the abuse of children by Catholic priests and the Church’s
cover up of that abuse.” Id.
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terest in maintaining the secrecy of the proceedings.  As Judge Eas-
terbrook noted:
Many a litigant would prefer that the subject of the case—how
much it agreed to pay for the construction of a pipeline, how
many tons of coal its plant uses per day, and so on—be kept
from the curious (including its business rivals and customers),
but the tradition that litigation is open to the public is of very
long standing.107
All this suggests is that a court-sponsored arbitration program of
the type being implemented by the Delaware Chancery Court runs
afoul of the qualified First Amendment right of access. Indeed, it
was along these lines that the district court ruled that a qualified
First Amendment right of access applies to Chancery arbitration
proceedings.108
The fact that parties engage in arbitration before a sitting
chancellor is not sufficient to reach a determination that confiden-
tiality of the proceedings is appropriate.  The label given to the ac-
tivity before the court is not sufficient to determine the outcome of
the analysis.109  Rather, courts will apply an “experience” factor to
the analysis of whether a particular proceeding is of the type that is
traditionally open to the public and the beneficiary of a qualified
First Amendment right of access.110  Pursuant to the Chancery
rules, the typical claim that one might expect to hear in arbitration
before a chancellor of the Chancery Court is a commercial contract
claim, a merger agreement, or shareholder litigation against or on
behalf of the company.111  Such claims are of the type that usually
appear before the Chancery Court in a formal session.
Take for example the dispute between Skyworks and AATI
that was heard before a chancellor in arbitration before the Chan-
cery Court.  In the Skyworks/AATI dispute, Skyworks petitioned
the chancellor in arbitration for a declaratory judgment that AATI
was in breach of the merger agreement signed by the parties, and
that Skyworks was entitled to terminate the contract or, in the al-
ternative, to receive damages.112  AATI also filed a petition with
the chancellor seeking a declaratory judgment from the chancellor
107 Union Oil Co. v. Leavell, 220 F.3d 562, 568 (7th Cir. 2000).
108 See Del. Coal. for Open Gov’t, 2012 WL 3744718 at 11.
109 See Press-Enter., 478 U.S. at 7.
110 Id. at 8.
111 However, Delaware’s Complex Commercial Litigation Division of the Superior Court of
Delaware is intended to hear commercial contract claims that are not associated with share-
holder claims or corporate law issues.
112 Skyworks Solutions, Inc., Form 8-K (Oct. 11, 2011).
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that AATI had not breached the merger agreement and that no
“material adverse effect” had occurred with respect to AATI.113
AATI sought specific performance of the merger agreement and
an order for Skyworks to close the transaction.114
Disputes over merger agreements, like that in the Skyworks/
AATI controversy, are typical of the kinds of cases traditionally
heard by chancellors in the Chancery Court.115  Such disputes have
been traditionally open to the press and the general public. Deci-
sions by the chancellors in these kinds of claims are made pursuant
to sometimes lengthy opinions, providing the parties and the public
a rationale for the outcome. Such was not the case in the Skyworks/
AATI dispute, where the parties brought their merger dispute
before a sitting chancellor pursuant to the Delaware arbitration
procedure.  Notwithstanding the fact that the parties called the
proceeding an arbitration and sought to have it heard confiden-
tially, the experience factor weighs heavily in favor of openness. In
the absence of the arbitration procedure, this claim would have
been heard before the same chancellor who would have publicly
reviewed the evidence and then issued a public rationale for his
decision.116  That is to say, there is no substantive difference be-
tween the arbitration procedure before the Chancery Court and a
formal judicial proceeding before the Chancery Court.117  The ex-
perience factor therefore weighs in favor of openness.
The second factor is the logic factor—whether logic dictates
that access to the proceeding of a particular government process, in
this case the Chancery-sponsored arbitration program, by the pub-
lic is “important in terms of that very process.”118  In disputes be-
tween private parties in contract, logic does not necessarily dictate
a role for public access to the process of dispute resolution.  In-
113 Id.
114 Id.
115 See, e.g., United Rentals, Inc. v. Ram Holdings, 937 A.2d 810 (Del. Ch. 2007); In re IBP
Shareholders Litigation, 789 A.2d 14 (Del. Ch. 2001); Frontier Oil Corp. v. Holly Corp., 2005
WL 1039027 (Del. Ch. 2005).
116 On the other hand, the Chancery Court has for the past decade implemented a voluntary
mediation-only program. In addition, the Chancery Court has a history of using its offices to
facilitate voluntary settlements of disputes. Although final settlements become part of the public
record because they must be approved by the court and are thus subject to public review, the
negotiations leading up to the settlements are confidential.
117 Although the legislation purports to limit arbitration proceedings to claims where parties
seek only a cash remedy, in the recent Skyworks/AATI dispute the parties sought equitable
remedies. The arbitration procedure is flexible enough to permit parties to contract for equitable
remedies notwithstanding the statutory limitation.
118 Richmond Newspapers v. Virginia, 448 U.S. at 555, 589 (1980).
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deed, one can argue for the same reasons that the Supreme Court
has developed jurisprudence in favor of arbitration that private
parties, in contract, should be free to take their disputes out of the
public realm and decided in alternate forums.  However, to the ex-
tent publicly traded corporations are involved in Chancery-spon-
sored arbitration, it would seem that the confidentiality of the
process would be inimical to the purpose of the shareholder
proceeding.119
However imperfect, shareholder litigation is an important ar-
row in the corporate governance quiver.120  Shareholders, particu-
larly those of public companies, are necessarily at some distance
from management, and the degree of oversight they are able to
directly play over corporations is attenuated. Without knowledge
with respect to issues decided by the court in a private session, pub-
lic shareholders are at a distinct disadvantage relative to insiders
and managers about governance of the corporation.
Logic dictates that when parties are litigating “bet-the-com-
pany” matters, like mergers, which implicate the rights of public
shareholders, those public shareholders would benefit directly
from having knowledge about the proceeding. If boards of direc-
tors are violating their fiduciary duties to the corporation then
logic dictates that shareholders, who are often at a distance, be in-
formed of the proceedings so that they might replace incompetent
directors.121  If the sole purpose of confidentiality is to protect in-
competent directors from the wrath of unhappy shareholders, then
confidentiality does not serve a logically useful function, though
convenient for management. Consequently, where the parties in-
clude a publicly traded corporation or shareholders without direct
representation on the board, they should have no expectation that
the results of the arbitration will be kept confidential.  Thus, arbi-
tral proceedings conducted by sitting chancellors, especially those
that involve shareholders of publicly traded corporations, should
119 “Secrecy is profoundly inimical to this demonstrative purpose of the trial process. Open
trials assure the public that procedural rights are respected, and that justice is afforded equally.”
Id. at 595.
120 “This remedy, born of stockholder helplessness, was long the chief regulator of corporate
management and has afforded no small incentive to avoid at least grosser forms of betrayal of
stockholders’ interests. It is argued, and not without reason, that without it there would be little
practical check on such abuses.” Cohen v. Beneficial Indus. Loan Corp., 337 U.S. 541, 548
(1949).
121 This is consistent with disclosure obligations under the U.S. securities laws.
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be presumptively public rather than private affairs, thus justifying a
right of access by the public.122
Of course, there may be other situations where the factual na-
ture of the issue in dispute is sensitive, either for business or per-
sonal reasons.  In such situations, confidentiality might be
appropriate.  Courts, of course, are no strangers to these kinds of
situations. Courts have developed narrowly tailored procedures to
issue protective orders when necessary to protect trade secrets or
prevent embarrassment. The Delaware courts themselves have reg-
ularly demonstrated their ability to safeguard competitive informa-
tion and other sensitive information. For example, in 2011, the
Hewlett-Packard Board was sued by a stockholder pursuant to
§220 of the Delaware Code seeking information to support a po-
tential derivative claim against the Board.123 The underlying facts
related to an alleged sexual harassment claim against the former
CEO. This type of information was highly embarrassing personally
to the former CEO, as well as to the alleged victim.  The courts in
that case were fully capable of keeping these facts out of the record
without minimizing the value attributed to exposing the rationale
of the court to public scrutiny.124  Such orders are narrowly tai-
lored, and balance the parties’ interest in confidentiality with the
shareholders’ and public’s interest in information about the compa-
nies they own and the current state of the law.
Of course, it is indisputable that federal policy now favors con-
fidential arbitration.  Where parties have decided to resolve their
disputes in private and in alternate forums, the law will not force
them into court.  Delaware’s response to perceived competition for
the adjudication of corporate matters attempts to give disputants
the best of all worlds: Delaware’s law and judiciary in a confiden-
tial setting.  In the context of the public company there is no obvi-
ous compelling government interest, akin to national security
concerns, that might justify keeping otherwise public proceedings
confidential.  Rather, where shareholders are widely dispersed
(Berles-Mean corporation), shareholders have a compelling inter-
122 “When [litigants] call on the courts, they must accept the openness that goes with subsi-
dized dispute resolution by public (and publicly accountable) officials. Judicial proceedings are
public rather than private property, and the third-party effects that justify the subsidy of the
judicial system also justify making records and decisions as open as possible.” Union Oil Co., 220
F.3d at 568.
123 Zucker v. Andreesen, 2012 WL 2366448 (Del. Ch. 2012).
124 A protective order under Rule 26(c) of the Chancery Court’s rules can be sought when
“justice requires [it] to protect a party or person from annoyance, embarrassment, oppression, or
undue burden or expense. . .” DEL. CH. R. 26(c).
\\jciprod01\productn\C\CAC\14-3\CAC309.txt unknown Seq: 28 23-APR-13 8:36
856 CARDOZO J. OF CONFLICT RESOLUTION [Vol. 14:829
est in making sure that litigation remains public and accessible to
beneficial shareholders.  To the extent that disputes involve sensi-
tive commercial or personal information, courts already have pro-
cedures to limit the disclosure of such information without
shielding the legal issues from public scrutiny.  Consequently,
Chancery-sponsored arbitration proceedings should be presump-
tively subject to the qualified First Amendment right of access not-
withstanding the name attached to the forum by the Delaware
legislature.125
V. NETWORKS, EXTERNALITIES, AND ARBITRATION
The market for corporate law and Delaware’s peculiar posi-
tion has long been a focus of study by academics.  Professors Cary
and Winter first engaged in a debate about the relative effect of
state competition for incorporations.  On the one hand, Professor
Cary argued that when states competed for incorporations, compe-
tition would set off a “race to the bottom” with respect to the sub-
stantive quality of the corporate law as managers, who controlled
re-incorporation decisions opted for states where the substantive
rules of the corporate law favored their interests.126  Judge Winter
observed that managerial decisions necessarily occurred in a capi-
tal market in which investors had the ability to punish managerial
decisions to reincorporate in jurisdictions that obviously favored
management’s interests over shareholder interests.  In such an en-
vironment, one might well expect shareholders to reward states
that adopted more shareholder-friendly substantive rules with
higher valuations, leading to a potentially virtuous “race to the
top” as managers sought out the best substantive rules in order to
maximize valuations and minimize the amount of equity required
in offerings.127
Although the state competition and the race to the top/bottom
framework dominated much of the academic thinking about the
role of Delaware in the corporate law, later work examined the
premise of state competition and found it lacking.  To the extent
125 “What happens in the halls of government is presumptively public business. Judges delib-
erate in private but issue public decisions after public arguments based on public records. The
political branches of government claim legitimacy by election, judges by reason. Any step that
withdraws an element of the judicial process from public view makes the ensuing decision look
more like fiat, which requires compelling justification.” Union Oil Co., 220 F.3d at 568.
126 Cary, supra note 6, at 666.
127 Winter, supra note 6, at 256.
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there is any competition at all, it appears to be heavily influenced
by a status quo bias in incorporation decisions.  Firms tend to in-
corporate in their home state (i.e. where they have their physical
headquarters). Professor Daines examined firms at the IPO stage
and found that where firms decided to re-incorporate prior to IPO,
they reincorporated almost exclusively in Delaware.128  The market
for corporate law, to the extent that there is one, is largely a com-
petition between home states and Delaware and not an even play-
ing field upon which all states compete.129  In a contemporaneous
study, Professor Kahan concluded that the notion of interstate
competition for incorporations is largely a myth, at least in recent
years.130  Other than Delaware, few states generate sufficient reve-
nue from the incorporation business to justify calling the phenom-
ena in the corporate law a market for corporate law.131  Delaware
is an aggressive actor in the corporate law space and the other
states have largely ceded the field as a result.
Rather than be a competitive fifty-state market, Professors
Roe and Jones have noted the salient competition for Delaware
has come from the federal government and the threat of preemp-
tion by federal securities laws.132  The federal government is likely
fully capable of preempting the entirety of the state-based corpo-
rate governance apparatus that has developed over the past cen-
tury.  Until now, it has for a variety of reasons opted to leave to the
states the question of governing most of the internal affairs of cor-
porations. In some areas, particularly the issuance and the sale of
securities, the federal government has stepped in to establish uni-
form rules to govern the marketplace. The self-imposed limitations
on federal intrusion into corporate law are largely arbitrary and the
result of politics.133  Consequently, although Delaware now domi-
nates the field of corporate governance, it does so with the federal
government always waiting in the wings for a unique combination
of political and economic factors that might push it to impose its
will on the corporate law.134  Against this backdrop, Delaware is
constantly engaged in a push-pull relationship with the federal gov-
ernment largely in an effort by Delaware to do just enough to keep
128 Daines, supra note 7, at 1580.
129 Id.
130 Kahan & Kamar, supra note 7, at 748.
131 Id.
132 Jones, supra note 8, at 660; Roe, supra note 8, at 589.
133 Jones, supra note 8, at 663; Roe, supra note 8, at 590.
134 Jones, supra note 8, at 661; Roe, supra note 8, at 590.
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the federal government from reaching out to preempt Delaware’s
dominant position.135
One cannot then clearly explain Delaware’s dominance as a
question of substantive law. Rather, Delaware’s dominance is
probably better understood as an economic question. Professors
Marcel Kahan and Michael Klausner explain Delaware’s domi-
nance as a product of network externalities and path depen-
dence.136  The corporate law, according to Professor Klausner,
demonstrates many attributes in common with a network.  To the
extent Delaware is able to sustain its dominant position relative to
other states and the federal government, it is due to the positive
externalities associated with the Delaware corporate law network.
Firms, managers, and others all face economic incentives that push
toward Delaware and discourage competition by other states.
A network market is characterized by complementarity and
standards, positive externalities, switching costs (i.e. lock-in), and
economies of scale in production.137  The corporate law is a system
of complementarity and standards.138  In addition to the corporate
code, the Delaware network includes judges and courts specialized
in the corporate law, and a deep corporate bar both in and out of
Delaware already extremely familiar with Delaware’s substantive
law.139 Delaware judges have taken an aggressive stance toward
broadcasting their opinions far and wide in both formal and infor-
mal ways.  This increased level of interconnectedness increases the
degree of compatibility and the likelihood that Delaware law can
set the standard for corporate law.140  The corporate law also dem-
onstrates a degree of positive externalities. Positive externalities
exist when the utility gained by relying on the corporate law is a
function of the number of other firms also relying on that same
system.141  The more ubiquitous the Delaware corporate law, the
lower the costs of learning to use it.  Professors Kahan and
135 Jones, supra note 8 at 663; Roe, supra note 8, at 644.
136 Klausner, supra note 17, at 843; Marcel Kahan & Michael Klausner, Path Dependence in
Corporate Contracting: Increasing Returns, Herd Behavior, and Cognitive Biases, 74 WASH. U. L.
Q. 347 (1996) [hereinafter Kahan & Klausner I]; Marcel Kahan & Michael Klausner, Standardi-
zation and Innovation in Corporate Contracting (Or “The Economics of Boilerplate”), 83 VA. L.
REV. 713 (1997) [hereinafter Kahan & Klausner II].
137 See OZ SHY, THE ECONOMICS OF NETWORKS 1 (2001).
138 Id. at 2; Nicholas Economides, The Economics of Networks, 14 INT.J.IND.ORG. 673, 676
(1996).
139 Kahan & Kamar, supra note 7, at 759.
140 Economides, supra note 138 (on interconnections and compatibility).
141 Id.; SHY, supra note 137, at 3.
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Klausner liken these externalities to the value boilerplate.142 With
respect to law and legal rules, the costs of learning new rules limit
the incentive of firms to re-incorporate in a competing jurisdic-
tion.143 Finally, there are significant economies of scale associated
with a corporate law network that require significant investments
for competitors to overcome.144
Professors Kahan and Klausner have argued persuasively that
corporate contracting, with respect to network externalities, is no
different from a host of other markets.145  Specifically, where par-
ties can adopt a standard term in corporate contracts, there are
increasing returns attributable to the common use of the term, not-
withstanding the substance of the term.146 Professor Klausner ob-
serves that in the contractarian model of corporate governance, the
value of any corporate governance term adopted by a firm is inde-
pendent of the number of other firms that have already adopted
the term.147  However, if a firm’s choice of governance term is in-
fluenced by the number of other firms that have previously
adopted such a term, then it is possible for the market for corpo-
rate law to reach suboptimal standards.148  That is, where network
effects are pervasive, the commonality of any particular term can
trump the substance of such a term.  The corporate law thus dem-
onstrates network effects.
The market for corporate law and the market for incorpora-
tions demonstrate indications of network externalities and compet-
itive strategies consistent with corporate law as a network good.149
First, the benefits to firms for incorporating in Delaware or adopt-
ing standard language in corporate documents are attributable to
the lower “learning costs,” higher quality and lower cost future le-
gal services, and greater predictability with respect to disputes and
dispute resolution.150  These learning costs all work to reinforce the
value of the existing standard and create significant barriers to en-
try, thus forestalling any potential competition against the estab-
lished network.  Second, the corporate law network has a large
142 Kahan & Klausner II, supra note 136, at 760.
143 Economides, supra note 138; SHY, supra note 137, at 1.
144 Economides, supra note 138; SHY, supra note 137, at 5–6.
145 Kahan & Klausner I, supra note 136; see also Kahan & Klausner II, supra note 136;
Klausner, supra note 17.
146 Kahan & Klausner II, supra note 136.
147 Klausner, supra note 17, at 761.
148 Id. at 759.
149 Kahan & Klausner II, supra note 136.
150 Kahan & Klausner I, supra note 136, at 352.
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“installed base” in the form of Delaware incorporations.  While not
a first mover in the corporate law, for a variety of reasons in the
early twentieth century, Delaware found itself with a dominant po-
sition in incorporations.151  More than 50% of all publicly traded
firms and more than 60% of Fortune 500 companies are incorpo-
rated in Delaware.152  The dominance in incorporations creates in-
ertia that reinforces the status quo.  In addition, the Delaware
network has large numbers of complementary services, from law-
yers to the Delaware courts.  Each of these complements, like Ap-
ple’s iTunes store, works to reinforce the incumbent’s position in
the network and dissuade competition.  Finally, Delaware has ag-
gressively pursued “preemption” strategies by moving quickly to
adopt governance reforms in an effort to dissuade potential com-
petitors (e.g. the federal government) from entering the market.
For example, recent moves to permit the adoption of majority vot-
ing and shareholder access bylaws are intended to convince the
U.S. Government that competition in governance is not neces-
sary.153  The existence of externalities and switching costs can per-
mit a suboptimal standard to persist for long periods of time.154
Networks often engage in a series of competitive strategies to sup-
port the persistence of the network.  All three competitive strate-
gies, first-mover, complementary suppliers, and preemption, can
work together to reinforce network lock-in effects and support a
dominant network, notwithstanding the presence of theoretically
more efficient alternatives.155
151 See Christopher Grandy, New Jersey Corporate Chartermongering, 1875-1929, 49 J. ECON.
HIST. 677 (1989).
152 Jeffrey Bullock, Del. Div. of Corps.: 2011 Annual Report, http://corp.delaware.gov/2011
CorpAR.pdfDel.
153 See, e.g., DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 8, §§ 212-13 (2006) (adopted in response to potential adop-
tion of majority voting and shareholder access rules by the SEC).
154 Evidence of the persistence of suboptimal standards due to network effects abound. Per-
haps the best known is the persistence of the QWERTY keyboard. Notwithstanding the later
arrival of a more efficient keyboard, for example the Dvorak keyboard standard, the QWERTY
keyboard persists because of high switching costs and lock-in effects. W. Brian Arthur, Compet-
ing Technologies, Increasing Returns, and Lock-In by Historical Events, 99 ECON. J. 116 (1989);
Stanley M. Besen & Joseph Farrell, Choosing How to Compete: Strategies and Tactics in Stand-
ardization, 8 J. ECON. PERSP. 117 (1994).
155 In many respects, Delaware’s substantive corporate law is not demonstrably different
from the corporate laws of many other states. Indeed, notwithstanding predictions to the con-
trary, the substantive corporate law of many other states is friendlier to managers than the sub-
stantive corporate law of Delaware. For instance, in the area of board responsibilities with
respect to unsolicited takeover offers, the Delaware law has developed an approach that is at
least circumspect of board actions in response to an unwanted takeover. When a board adopts
defensive measures in such situations, before the board can enjoy the benefit of the business
judgment presumption, boards will have to satisfy the court that they concluded, after a reasona-
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The adoption of the Chancery-sponsored arbitration proce-
dure in 2010 is an example of a preemption strategy.  By moving
early to establish a formal arbitration regime within the Chancery
Court, the clear intent of the Delaware legislature was to dissuade
potential competition to Delaware adjudications from developing.
In defending the Chancery arbitration procedure before the fed-
eral courts, counsel for Delaware, framing the context for competi-
tion for adjudications as global, argued that without procedure
parties might seek to adjudicate contract disputes before arbitra-
tors outside the United States.156  In the absence of Chancery arbi-
tration, potential litigants might have an incentive to voluntarily
take their disputes out of Delaware.  Adoption of the Chancery
arbitration procedure was then at least in part an attempt by Dela-
ware legislators to dissuade parties from seeking to adjudicate
overseas by way of private arbitration.157
Adjudications before the Chancery Court are an important
complementary component of Delaware’s corporate law network.
The Chancery Court is well known for its competence in adjudicat-
ing business and shareholder disputes.  As a result, the Chancery
Court and precedent it creates through its decisions play a central
function in maintaining the value of Delaware’s corporate law net-
work.  Arbitration, as it has developed in the past few decades, rep-
resents potential competition to this important component of
Delaware’s network.  To the extent policymakers in Delaware see a
potential threat to Delaware-based adjudications from future pri-
ble investigation, that some threat existed to the corporation and that the response was reasona-
ble in relation to the threat posed. Unocal Corp. v. Mesa Petroleum, Co., 493 A.2d 946 (Del.
1985). In many states, legislatures have written Unocal’s “intermediate standard” out of exis-
tence. For example, in Massachusetts the corporate law provides in Section 8.30 that a director
may benefit from the business judgment rule in similar situations by acting in good faith, with
care, and in the best interests of the corporation. Section 8.30 essentially writes out of existence
any Massachusetts corollary to Delaware’s Unocal, and for that matter, Revlon. In The Market
for Corporate Law, Oren Bar-Gill, Michal Barzuza, and Lucien Bebchuk posit a model that
suggests Delaware should adopt more manager friendly provisions with respect to takeovers. In
fact, Delaware’s rules are less manager-friendly than predicted by the authors. See Oren Bar-
Gill, Michal Barzuza, & Lucien Bebchuk, The Market for Corporate Law, 62 J. INST. & THEO.
ECON. 134 (2006).
156 Del. Bar Ass’n Amicus Brief, supra note 71; NASDAQ Amicus Brief, supra note 18. See
Peg Brickley, Secrecy Puts Judges on Defense in Delaware, WALL ST. J. (Feb. 21, 2012), available
at wsj.com/article/SB10001424052970204131004577235240702540000.html.
157 In global transactions, arbitration is often preferable to the courts in part because unlike
court judgments, arbitral judgments benefit from the New York Convention, which eases the
ability of litigants to enforce awards across jurisdictional boundaries. Convention on the Recog-
nition and Enforcement of Foreign Arbitral Awards, Jun. 10 1958, 21 U.S.T. 2517, 330 U.N.T.S.
38 (1958).
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vate arbitration proceedings, the existence of a Delaware-based al-
ternative to arbitrations may generate an incentive for parties not
to exit Delaware in favor of private alternatives.
Thus, the clear objective of the Chancery-sponsored arbitra-
tion procedure is to preempt potential development of competition
from private arbitration in the market for adjudications.  It is worth
asking whether the benefit of this preemption strategy to adopt the
arbitration procedure and moving cases from the formal docket to
the arbitration docket is worth the potential cost to Delaware’s
franchise over the long term.  Here the answer is ambiguous. It is
not entirely clear that the Chancery arbitration procedure is mate-
rially better than pursuing dispute resolution via the formal, public
system.  At the same time, there are obvious long-term costs to the
value of other aspects of Delaware’s network should the arbitra-
tion preemption strategy be successful. Given the marginal value of
arbitration relative to its costs, the addition of a Chancery arbitra-
tion procedure is likely a net negative for Delaware and its corpo-
rate law franchise over the long-term.
VI. ASSESSING THE COSTS AND BENEFITS OF ARBITRATION
BEFORE THE CHANCERY COURT
Arbitration is often lauded for its many advantages over dis-
pute resolution through the courts.  For example, one of the advan-
tages of private arbitration over litigation is said to be speed.
Because private arbitration involves a docket of only one, resolu-
tion of disputes can be accomplished much faster than when claims
must compete for space in the overwhelmed court docket.  It is not
clear that Chancery arbitration will necessarily be faster than
claims heard before the Chancery court in the normal manner.
Delaware is already known for its relatively speedy docket.  For
example, the case of Martin Marietta, Inc. v. Vulcan Materials
Co.158 is a typical contract dispute brought before the Chancery
Court.  The parties in Vulcan asked the Court to rule on whether
Martin Marietta had breached its duties under a nondisclosure
agreement when it made an unsolicited bid for Vulcan.159  The time
between the date of filing of the initial complaint and the issuance
of a final order of judgment was just over six months.  The time
period included a full trial on the merits and an appeal to the Dela-
158 Martin Marietta Materials, Inc. v. Vulcan Materials Co., 56 A.3d 1072 (Del. Ch. 2012).
159 Id. at 1077.
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ware Supreme Court.160  Most claims do not get as far as a full trial
and appeal.  In fact, most claims are settled after the application
for a temporary restraining order or a motion to dismiss.  In Vul-
can, that milestone came six weeks after the claim was filed.  By
any measure, six weeks from filing until disposition of a claim is
speedy.  By rule, claims brought to the Chancery Court for resolu-
tion by arbitration must be set for a preliminary conference on sub-
stantive and procedural matters and a hearing must be scheduled
within ten days after the petition for arbitration has been received
by the court.  The arbitration hearing itself must be held on a mu-
tually convenient day within ninety days of filing.161  Though faster
than a formal proceeding through final appeal, the arbitration pro-
ceeding is not obviously faster for parties than a formal claim
through the Chancery Court.
A second supposed advantage of private arbitration is that it
permits parties to select an expert in the field to conduct the arbi-
tration.  Having a decision-maker with expertise in the substantive
area of the dispute helps reduce the time and expense involved in
educating the decision-maker.  Of course, one of Delaware’s long-
standing advantages in the adjudication of commercial disputes is
the expertise of its specialized judiciary.  Since anyone seeking ad-
judication of a dispute through the Chancery Court would have
access to these jurists, the Chancery-sponsored arbitration proce-
dure does not provide any obvious advantage relative to formal
adjudication in this respect.
A third advertised advantage of private arbitration is that it
grants parties additional flexibility so that they can simplify the dis-
pute resolution process.  It is true that the Chancery-sponsored ar-
bitration procedure does not specify any particular process that
might constrain the parties, and that the parties are free, with the
consent of the arbitrator, to select whatever procedural approach
they believe most appropriate to the resolution of their dispute.
However, there is no reason to suspect that Delaware judges are
hamstrung by their own procedures in a way that makes dispute
resolution onerous or time consuming for the parties.  Indeed, one
criticism of the Chancery Court is that it often resolves issues of
fact and law at the motion to dismiss stage, perhaps too early in the
process when such cases might be more appropriately resolved at a
160 See id.
161 DEL. CH. R. 97 (2012).
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later point in the proceeding.162  In addition, rulings of a Chancery-
sponsored arbitration procedure are subject to appeals to the Dela-
ware Supreme Court.  The prospect of an appellate review may im-
pose implicit constraints on the degree of flexibility that a
chancellor or the parties may place on the dispute resolution pro-
cess.  A chancellor/arbitrator who suspects that an appeal is possi-
ble may feel the need to create a record and justify his rationale for
the decision by way of a lengthy opinion to deter (or perhaps facili-
tate) a later appeal.  In the absence of a record or a reasoned opin-
ion, the Supreme Court may be forced to take up appeals de novo,
building a record and conducting a trial.  By any measure, requir-
ing an appellate court to conduct a trial is unusual.  However, it
might be necessary if parties rely on summary procedures and min-
imal records.  As a consequence, even though the Chancery-spon-
sored arbitration procedure provides for flexibility, there is reason
to suspect that the ultimate process adopted by the court will not
diverge a great degree from the Chancery Court’s established
processes.
The final stated advantage of arbitration over litigation is con-
fidentiality.  Indeed, the ability to keep proceedings and outcomes
confidential is often cited as a one of the most important advan-
tages of arbitration over litigation.  Without confidentiality in arbi-
tration, parties may have important trade secrets revealed or
embarrassing details of corporate management heard in the public
realm.  Similarly, parties may feel they need to adopt confronta-
tional positions in the courtroom that they might not have adopted
if they were assured of confidentiality.
It is not clear, however, that confidentiality against these kinds
of disclosures by an arbitrator in the Chancery Court is all that
valuable.  The advantage of confidentiality presumes that courts
are somehow unable to prevent the disclosure of information, like
valuable trade secrets, which parties might not wish to end up in
the public domain.  However, courts, including the Chancery Court
in Delaware, are capable of using protective orders in order to pre-
vent valuable trade secrets from being revealed into the public do-
main.163  The use of a protective order is a narrowly tailored
response to the concern by parties that valuable information might
162 See, e.g., Comments of Justice Carolyn Berger at Boston College Law School, Apr. 24,
2011 (on file with author).
163 Arthur Miller, Confidentiality, Protective Orders, and Public Access to the Courts, 105
HARV. L. REV. 428, 464–67 (1991) (providing an overview of the law with respect to protective
orders).
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end up in the public domain.  A protective order permits parties to
shield valuable information from inadvertent disclosure and en-
sures that the court is able to assess the legal issues in the case.
The use of narrowly drawn protective orders permits the court to
shield parties’ valuable information, while exposing the law and le-
gal analysis behind the court’s decision to public scrutiny.
Parties may wish to have certain potentially embarrassing be-
havior or facts related to actions of executives or directors of the
corporation shielded from public exposure. Recent experience (e.g.
Zucker v. Andreesen164), suggests that courts are capable of relying
on protective orders in order to keep the most salacious details out
of the public eye.165  In Zucker, a shareholder sued the corporation
alleging waste after the board made a large severance payment to
Mark Hurd, the former CEO.166  Mr. Hurd resigned in the wake of
a sexual harassment allegation against him.167  Such allegations
were obviously personally embarrassing for those involved.  In that
case, the Chancery Court was able to keep the most salacious alle-
gations out of the public domain through the use of protective or-
ders without compromising its ability to assess the facts and legal
issues and issue a legal opinion that the public could evaluate on its
own merits.
However, even if parties believed courts were unable to pro-
vide them with sufficient protection for their trade secrets or other
information and went to private arbitration to avoid disclosures,
there are real limits to a publicly traded firm’s ability to keep mate-
rial information confidential, particularly in cases that one might
expect to appear before a chancellor arbitrator. The typical case, at
least initially, that a chancellor arbitrator will hear is a merger
agreement.  In such cases, where the seller is public, the relevant
information about the dispute will likely be deemed to be material
and must be filed with the SEC.  In the case of a merger contract,
the results of any arbitration will be material to the shareholders of
the seller and will, as a result, have to be disclosed to shareholders.
Consequently, there should be no expectation of confidentiality in
arbitrations involving mergers or other material agreements.  To
164 Zucker v. Andreessen, 2012 WL 2366448 (Del. Ch. 2012).
165 Miller, supra note 163, at 476 (observing that “[t]he protective order is an ideal mecha-
nism for minimizing the negative side effects of modern discovery without eviscerating the value
of the process.”).
166 Zucker, 2012 WL 2366448.
167 Tom Hals & Jim Finkle, Ex-HP CEO Hurd Fights to Keep Letter Confidential, REUTERS,
Dec. 28, 2010, available at http://uk.reuters.com/article/2010/12/28/us-hewlettpackard-hurd-law
suit-idUKTRE6BR3GB20101228.
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the extent parties rely on arbitrations, the results of such arbitra-
tions may be disclosed in part to the public but do not become legal
precedent.  For example, in the Skyworks dispute, the result of that
dispute was not confidential. The parties ultimately renegotiated
the terms of the agreement with the arbitrator acting as
facilitator.168  If the chancellor arbitrator actually ruled in favor of
one party or the other, then the result would have been disclosed
by the seller as information, but the ruling itself would not have
lived beyond the facts of the claim between Skyworks and AATI.
The direct benefits associated with arbitration before the
Chancery Court may be minimal.  However, Chancery arbitration
proceedings not only pose constitutional challenges, but also pose
long-term risks to the value of the Delaware corporate law
franchise.  To the extent that there are real benefits at all, those
benefits appear to be tied to the blanket confidentiality afforded by
Chancery arbitration proceedings.  This confidentiality is constitu-
tionally troublesome.  Confidentiality of the proceedings is also a
direct threat to the value and viability of Delaware’s corporate law
franchise over the long term.  The inability of arbitration, even
when the results are publicly known, to act as durable precedent
may be damaging to the value of that franchise.  The observation
by U.S. Supreme Court Justice Anthony Kennedy that civil cases
have largely left the Court’s docket because the Court’s preference
for arbitration has pushed parties into private resolution of con-
tract disputes is a valuable insight into the potential future impact
of a Chancery arbitration procedure on the Delaware franchise.169
Elsewhere, Professor Jennifer Johnson has observed that since the
development of mandatory arbitration with respect to broker-
dealer disputes, there has been virtually no development of the law
in that area so that all disputes related to broker-dealer issues have
been removed from the formal legal system.170
Consider a thought experiment in which the Chancery arbitra-
tion system survives constitutional challenges, or is revived in a
manner that comports with constitutional requirements, but main-
tains the confidentiality of proceedings. What might be the impact
over the long term of a Chancery arbitration system?
168 It is not altogether uncommon for parties seeking to enforce a material adverse change
(MAC) clause to use the threat of a MAC clause to renegotiate the merger consideration. See
Robert T. Miller, Canceling the Deal: Two Models of Material Adverse Change Clauses in Busi-
ness Combination Agreements, 31 CARDOZO L. REV. 99 (2009).
169 See Skyworks Solutions, Inc., FORM 8-K (Dec. 5, 2011).
170 Jennifer Johnson, Critiquing Arbitration of Shareholder Claims, 36 SEC. REG. L. J. 181
(2008).
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The first, most obvious, place for a revived Chancery arbitra-
tion program to take root is in merger contracts.  This is the easiest
to envision because merger disputes are no more than contract
cases.  Contract disputes in other settings are already regularly re-
solved through arbitration rather than the courts.  It does not re-
quire much to envision a significant percentage of merger
agreements including arbitration provisions.  Take, for example,
the Skyworks/AATI case where the parties opted into arbitration
for resolution of contractual disputes related to the merger agree-
ment.  Parties have an incentive to rely on arbitration over formal
proceeding if the costs and timing are marginally improved over
the normal Chancery proceeding.  The parties themselves have lit-
tle incentive to consider the positive externalities associated with
having their dispute resolved through the normal Chancery pro-
ceeding.  The impact of a significant number of merger-related dis-
putes exiting the formal legal system on Delaware’s corporate law
franchise will likely be negligible.  This is likely true for two rea-
sons.  First, the questions before the court in such cases are con-
tract law questions.  Delaware judges have never purported to have
any special insight into the application of contract law doctrine.  Of
course, there are circumstances where Delaware judges have de-
cided contract questions as they have arisen in the particular con-
text of a merger transaction (e.g. IBP Tyson). However, rarely, if
ever, do Delaware judges in such cases claim to be doing more than
applying the norms of contract interpretation and contract com-
mon law to the facts presented before them.
Indeed, in only a small number of transactions in a sample of
merger agreements from 2009-2011 (1%), Delaware courts were
asked to interpret New York contract law in the event of a dispute.
That is to say, when Delaware courts rule on contract claims, they
are often doing so without the ability to set precedent.  If Delaware
were to exit the stage with respect to merger litigation in favor of
confidential, Chancery arbitration might have little or no impact on
the development of the contract law beyond the impact on the par-
ties themselves.
A second, and perhaps more concerning question, is the po-
tential impact on the Delaware franchise if provisions requiring
Chancery arbitration are included on certificates of incorporation
or corporate bylaws.  The present position of the SEC staff is that
arbitration provisions in corporate charter documents represent il-
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legal waivers of the securities laws.171  As a consequence, to date,
the SEC has not permitted a firm to go public with such provisions
in place.  However, arbitration provisions are, in effect, nothing
more than forum selection provisions.172  Rather than select a court
of a particular state or jurisdiction, the parties select an arbitration
panel for the resolution of disputes.  The SEC readily accepts ex-
clusive forum provisions in corporate charters of IPO firms, which
permits firms undertaking an IPO to elect to have shareholder liti-
gation be resolved exclusively before the Delaware Chancery
Court.173  Given the policy established by Congress in the FAA and
supported by the U.S. Supreme Court in favor of forum selection
provisions and arbitration, it is conceivable that the SEC may even-
tually extend the flexibility in the selection of the forum to the se-
lection of arbitration in the corporate charters of IPO firms.
Independently, Professor Barbara Black and Paul Weitzel
have suggested that successful implementation of arbitration provi-
sions in corporate charter documents could lead to the end of
shareholder litigation.174  Following the U.S. Supreme Court’s deci-
sion in AT&T v. Concepcion, it is conceivable that reliance on arbi-
tration provisions in corporate charters could lead to the end of
representative shareholder litigation entirely.175  In recent years,
transaction-related litigation has become, from the point of view of
some, an unwelcome part of the deal landscape.  Studies suggest
that upwards of 80% of merger transactions are now accompanied
by litigation, and many mergers are accompanied by multiple law-
suits in more than one forum.176  If firms are permitted to include
mandatory Chancery-sponsored arbitration provisions in corporate
charters, reliance on such provisions could force all disputes into
171 Barbara Black, Eliminating Securities Fraud Class Actions Under the Radar, 2009 COLUM.
BUS. L. REV. 802 (2009). See also Kevin Roose, Carlyle Drops Arbitration Clause from I.P.O.
Plans, N.Y. TIMES, Feb. 3, 2012, available at http://dealbook.nytimes.com/2012/02/03/carlyle-
drops-arbitration-clause-from-i-p-o-plans/.
172 Barbara Black, Arbitration of Investors’ Claims Against Issuers: An Idea Whose Time Has
Come?, 75 LAW & CONTEMP. PROBS. 107, 112 (2012); Paul D. Weitzel, The End of Shareholder
Litigation? Allowing Shareholders to Customize Enforcement through Arbitration Provisions in
Charters and Bylaws, B.Y.U. L. REV. (forthcoming 2013).
173 Quinn, supra note 10, at 191 (listing IPO firms with exclusive forum provisions).
174 Black, supra note 172, at 804; Weitzel supra note 172.
175 AT&T Mobility LLC v. Concepcion, 131 S. Ct. 1740 (2011). Admittedly, this is an extreme
outcome, but not inconceivable given current attitudes of the court in favor of arbitration. See
Miriam Gilles & Gary Friedman, After Class: Aggregate Litigation in the Wake of AT&T Mobil-
ity v. Concepcion, 79 U. CHI. L. REV. 623 (2012).
176 Armour, Black, & Cheffins, supra note 10; Cain & Davidoff, supra note 10; Quinn, supra
note 10, at 147.
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one forum and strip potential litigants of the right to represent the
shareholder class.  In that way, Chancery-sponsored arbitration
provisions could reduce incentives for entrepreneurial plaintiff
counsel from bringing shareholder challenges.177
The elimination, or at least the corralling, of shareholder liti-
gation would certainly be a dramatic result.  Shareholder litigation
has been both a savior and the enemy of corporate governance for
almost as long as it has existed.178  Chancery arbitration raises the
alluring prospect of on the one hand reducing the problem of
shareholder litigation, while on the other assuring that the steady
hands of Delaware chancellors maintain control over shareholder
disputes.  On its face, the elimination of “strike suits” and a
streamlining of litigation through the Delaware arbitration proce-
dure appear to be an attractive result.  However, the elimination is
not without significant costs, which over the long term might
threaten Delaware’s corporate law franchise.
Delaware arbitration may well inadvertently reduce lock-in
and encourage the development of competition for incorporations
where previously such competition did not exist. The existence of
switching costs, costs that must be incurred in the event a partici-
pant wishes to move away from an existing standard, are an impor-
tant component of Delaware’s competitiveness.  To the extent
future shareholder disputes are resolved in Chancery arbitration
rather than openly through the courts, Delaware risks degrading
the continued maintenance and development of its corporate com-
mon law.  Such was the experience of contract law development
related to broker-dealer disputes following the imposition of
mandatory arbitration.179
The prospect that the arbitration option might become popu-
lar with firms, thus leading to a stunting of the development of the
corporate law, is a real one.  Parties have few incentives to pursue
claims in the public system when the costs of such claims are mar-
ginally higher than the costs of pursuing claims through arbitration.
Plaintiffs are likely going to be indifferent to the positive network
effects of their particular claim with respect to the precedent ques-
177 Quinn, supra note 10, at 143–156 (discussing the problem of multi-forum litigation in the
context of exclusive forum provisions).
178 Cohen v. Beneficial Indus. Corp., 337 U.S. at 541, 548 (1949). (“This remedy, born of
stockholder helplessness, was long the chief regulator of corporate management and has af-
forded no small incentive to avoid at least grosser forms of betrayal of stockholders’ interests. It
is argued, and not without reason, that without it there would be little practical check on such
abuses.”).
179 Black, supra note 172, at 830.
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tion.  The generation of precedent for subsequent litigants does not
enter into the equation for determining whether or not to pursue
arbitration versus litigation unless the parties are serial litigants
before the court.180  Parties who will benefit from the generation of
new precedent are future litigants. Parties, particularly firms, thus
have no incentive to pursue claims in the public system for the pur-
pose of generating precedent.181  Litigants with “future stakes”
have no ability to influence the decisions of present litigants with
respect to their decision to pursue arbitration.182
The presence of a thick corporate common law that is regu-
larly updated is central to the continued viability of Delaware’s
corporate law franchise.  Practitioners, including lawyers, have in-
vested significant resources in mastering the corporate common
law.  This investment represents switching costs that lock market
participants into the Delaware network.  As parties shift to confi-
dential arbitration, the value of those investments will decline.
Rather than look to the common law as developed through the
large number of opinions crafted by the Delaware chancellors
every year and reported through publicly accessible databases,
practitioners seeking to learn the current state of the corporate law
will have to invest resources into unorthodox sources in order to
maintain a sense of the pulse of the current state of corporate law.
Rather than publicly available databases of court opinions, practi-
tioners will be required to rely on personal relationships with
judges and members of the Delaware bar to learn the current state
of the law.  This is a high-cost strategy that immediately excludes
large numbers of practitioners who lack access to the inner circle of
Wilmington.  The closed network of arbitration makes transac-
tional planning difficult without advice of Delaware counsel,
whereas previously parties could rely on New York or other coun-
sel who simply looked at the record.  With arbitration, knowledge
of the current state of the law is reduced only to Delaware liti-
gators who appear before arbitral bodies.  Rather than benefit
from an open network, the arbitration path creates a closed net-
work with high costs for participation.
The high cost of this closed network approach to the corporate
law reduces incentives for lawyers to stay in Delaware and creates
opportunities for potential competition where previously there
were none.  From the point of view of opportunistic states or the
180 See Landes & Posner, supra note 16, at 236.
181 Id.
182 Id.
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federal government seeking to compete with Delaware, a shift into
Chancery arbitration provides an opportunity for a relatively small
investment in other jurisdictions to lure firms and their lawyers
away from Delaware and toward an alternative regime that might
require little or no additional investment to learn a new standard.
Perhaps more correctly, by raising the costs of learning the current
state of the law, lawyers have an incentive to counsel localization
of the corporate law over staying with the Delaware standard.
In a world of shareholder arbitration and confidential rulings,
the Delaware judiciary could attempt to stem the negative conse-
quences of confidentiality on its jurisprudence.  Already, Delaware
judges play an active role in the profession.  They are frequent
speakers at law schools and at conferences of business lawyers.
They engage the academy through regular contributions to law re-
views and symposia.  Continued active involvement with the pro-
fession beyond a small circle, however, is not costless.  Such a
strategy takes time and resources that compete with the primary
occupation of the judiciary of dispute resolution.  In addition, while
treatise writing and more engagement with the profession may be
sufficient to maintain at least a general sense of the corporate law,
they may not be sufficient or timely for practitioners counseling
clients.183
Although there are no states actively competing with Dela-
ware for incorporations presently, it is by no means assured that
Delaware will maintain its preeminent position, or that given the
right opportunity, other states will not seek to compete again for
incorporations.  For its part, after New Jersey faltered and passed
restrictions on corporations at the insistence of then-Governor Wil-
son in 1913, Delaware vaulted past New Jersey in the competition
for incorporations.184  There is no reason why Delaware cannot
also pursue a policy-based “own goal” in the form of Chancery ar-
bitration.  To the extent arbitration removes important cases from
the public courts, it reduces the value of Delaware’s network.  As
the value of the network declines over time, the switching costs
183 See Frank Partnoy, Synthetic Common Law, 53 U. KAN. L. REV. 281 (2005) (describing
the development of a version of a “synthetic common law” from arbitration claims).
184 This kind of opportunistic movement is not dissimilar from how Delaware was able to take
advantage of misplays by New Jersey and essentially co-opt all of the New Jersey firms at the
time. Delaware’s predominance, it is worth remembering, was not initially a product of efficiency
so much as it was a product of New Jersey Governor Woodrow Wilson’s overreach. Delaware
adopted New Jersey’s corporation law in its entirety and, following Governor Wilson’s decision
to impose anti-trust constraints on firms incorporated in New Jersey, firms moved en masse to
neighboring Delaware. See Grandy, supra note 151.
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that lock in many practitioners may also decline and thus increase
the incentive for states to reengage in competition for
incorporations.185
More generally, Chancery arbitration raises a normative ques-
tion: whether it is better for firms to resolve shareholder disputes
out of the public eye through private arbitration procedures. The
answer requires some subtlety.  The U.S Supreme Court and the
Congress, through the FAA, have indicated a policy in favor of ar-
bitration.  The policy is based in part on the reasonable belief that
the parties to the contract themselves are in the best position to
determine the most cost effective and efficient forum for the reso-
lution of their disputes.  Where this is the case, there is no reason
to require parties to bring disputes through the formal mechanism.
With respect to disputes over the merger contracts, there is no
reason to believe ex ante that contracts are best adjudicated in a
public forum.  Where parties have equal bargaining power and are
represented by experienced counsel, one might well be agnostic re-
garding the question of whether parties agree to resolve disputes
through formal mechanisms or through arbitration.  In that respect,
merger agreements are the opposite of consumer contracts and
contracts of adhesion.  They are heavily negotiated and legal coun-
sel is heavily engaged in the process.  In addition, the doctrinal is-
sues that often array themselves in contract disputes are not
necessarily new or original and can safely be resolved by an arbi-
trator rather than a judge.  Consequently, the initial thought might
be that, in mergers, parties should be free to arbitrate.
However, where arbitration involves shareholder litigation,
the contractual arguments in favor of arbitration become less com-
pelling.  First, to the extent the results of shareholder arbitration
are akin to representative litigation, one may have reason to be
concerned that confidential arbitration makes it difficult for share-
holders who are not directly represented before the arbitrator to
be confident in the quality of the outcome.  Shareholder litigation
is already itself a remedy apt for abuse.186  Subsequent to the U.S.
Supreme Court’s decision in AT&T v. Concepcion, shareholder ar-
bitration may be even less likely to instill confidence in the ability
185 New York appears to recognize the importance of increasing the value of the New York
commercial common law network. In the Task Force’s report to the Chief Judge, the Task Force
recommended increasing the visibility of the commercial court’s jurisprudence through the es-
tablishment of a free, text-searchable database of court opinions from the Commercial Division.
TASK FORCE, supra note 56, at 13. See Coyle, supra note 55, at 1923 (noting that nineteen states
have developed specialized business courts).
186 See Cohen, 337 U.S. at 548.
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of confidential arbitration to guarantee the rights of shareholders
who are not before the arbitrator.187  If firms were to begin to
adopt Chancery arbitration provisions as part of their incorpora-
tion documents, it is conceivable that firms might also restrict the
ability of shareholders to bring shareholder class action claims or
other forms of representative shareholder litigation.188  In that way,
Chancery arbitration could spell the end of shareholder litigation
altogether.  This is concededly an extreme result, but it is possible.
No doubt given the current state of transaction-related litigation, it
may be preferred by many.
To the extent representative shareholder arbitration continues,
the representative nature of shareholder dispute resolution re-
quires at the very least, widespread distribution of information
with respect to the content of the litigation that makes the confi-
dential nature of Chancery arbitration unworkable.  Without wide-
spread distribution of information about the litigation,
shareholders who are not directly represented may lose confidence
in the ability of the dispute resolution process to adequately and
fairly represent the interests of all shareholders.  To the extent con-
fidentiality of the proceedings is central to the value of Chancery
arbitration, this may be in conflict with the requirements of
fairness.
In addition, shareholders have certain statutory disclosure
rights. In the event of litigation consequent to a merger agreement,
shareholders have the right to make an informed vote whether to
approve the merger agreement. Where there is transaction-related
arbitration, shareholders have a statutory right to know the result
of the arbitration before they cast their vote. If the result of arbi-
tration is clothed in confidentiality, then shareholders may not
have material information required in order to appropriately ap-
prove a merger agreement.  Arbitration, therefore, may be incon-
sistent with shareholders’ statutory rights to information where
that arbitration is related to a proposed transaction.
Where there is shareholder arbitration outside the context of a
merger agreement, shareholders may also have rights to disclosure
under the both corporate and securities laws.  The securities laws
require the disclosure of material information to shareholders.
Corporate laws also have a similar duty of disclosure that may
187 AT&T Mobility LLC v. Concepcion, 131 S.Ct. at 1740 (2011) (holding that states are pro-
hibited from conditioning the enforceability of certain arbitration agreements on the availability
of class-wide arbitration procedures).
188 Professor Black recognized this possibility early on. See Black, supra note 172.
\\jciprod01\productn\C\CAC\14-3\CAC309.txt unknown Seq: 46 23-APR-13 8:36
874 CARDOZO J. OF CONFLICT RESOLUTION [Vol. 14:829
make it difficult for firms to rely on confidential arbitration to con-
ceal management misdeeds.  This will be especially true when the
questions before the arbitrator relate to the failure of managers of
the corporation to comply with their fiduciary duties to the corpo-
ration.  Without access to the results of litigation, shareholders may
find it difficult to uncover managerial improprieties. The impor-
tance of shareholder litigation, however imperfect, in uncovering
and thus constraining potential management overreach is an ample
enough reason to conclude that shareholder litigation is best un-
dertaken in the full light of day, even if those closed proceedings
are before a Delaware chancellor, rather than before closed-door
arbitration proceedings.
VII. CONCLUSION
In implementing Chancery-sponsored arbitration, proponents
may think they are making the best of a bad, long-term situation.
Delaware policymakers fear the rise of private arbitration as a
competitor with Delaware in the market for the adjudication of
corporate disputes. The creation of an arbitration forum before
Delaware chancellors is an attempt to preempt the development of
private arbitration for merger agreements and shareholder litiga-
tion and, in that way, maintain Delaware’s market position.  How-
ever, leaving aside the questions of constitutionality of the
proceedings, the effort to preempt the development of private arbi-
tration may simply prove too much.
First, there is not much evidence to support the contention
that parties are presently seeking to bring merger disputes or
shareholder disputes to forums other than Delaware.  There is even
less evidence to support a contention that Delaware faces competi-
tion for adjudications from international forums.  Second, if Dela-
ware is successful in promoting its Chancery arbitration, there is
reason to suspect that a significant amount of shareholder litigation
would be converted over time to Chancery arbitration as managers
seek ways to mitigate the problem of “strike suits.”  The result may
be to erode the value of Delaware’s corporate law franchise and
thus reduce barriers to competition.
Until now, other states have been content to sit on the incor-
poration competition sidelines.  However, if increasingly more
shareholder litigation is resolved as arbitration, the barriers to en-
try in the market for incorporations may decrease over time.  With
\\jciprod01\productn\C\CAC\14-3\CAC309.txt unknown Seq: 47 23-APR-13 8:36
2013] DELAWARE’S CORPORATE LAW FRANCHISE 875
lower barriers to entry, lawyers may find it cheaper and easier to
counsel their clients to incorporate in alternate jurisdictions, thus
enticing new entrants into what was a dormant market.  In that
way, Chancery arbitration may prove to be an “own goal” that
places Delaware’s position with respect to its corporate franchise in
jeopardy.  Given the state’s interest in maintaining its position,
Delaware may be better served by abandoning the Chancery-spon-
sored arbitration system altogether and finding a way to live in
peace with the prospect of private arbitration.
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